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The first and second chapters examine the disincentive effects of the 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) Program’s generosity on the employment decisions 
of prime age blind and/or deaf individuals. Using an individual-level model with state 
and time-fixed effects and the Difference-in-Difference method, I find only small impacts 
of an increase in monthly SSI benefits. Grouping all blind and deaf individuals together, 
the estimated impact of a $100 increase in monthly maximum SSI benefits (about a 17% 
increase) is only a 0.4 percentage point reduction in labor force participation. The 
estimated effects from separate analysis by demographic groups, however, suggest larger 
reductions (about 1 percentage point) in labor force participation. The largest impact 
found in this study suggests a 4 percentage point reduction in the labor force participation 
of high school dropout blind and/or deaf individuals from a $100 increase in monthly 
maximum SSI benefits. Using an alternative definition of labor supply (hours of work per 
year) I still find only a small impact of SSI generosity on the labor force participation 
decision. Specifically, a $100 increase in maximum SSI benefits per month reduces hours 
of work per year by 4 hours for all the blind and/or deaf individuals.  
The third chapter explores the effects of chronic child illness on married mother’s 
labor force participation decision using longitudinal data from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and Child Development Supplements (CDS). Mothers of sick children 
may remain at home in order to care for their children. Alternatively, mothers may decide 




suggest that a sick child negatively affects mothers’ labor supply, most studies use only 
cross-section datasets and therefore lacking information on changes in both child health 
and labor supply of mothers over time. The long term or permanent nature of chronic 
child illness may adversely affect a married mother’s labor force participation decision 
over several years in a way that cannot be observed in a single year analysis. Using a 
pooled Probit model and exploiting the panel structure of the data from 1997 to 2007, I 
find that having at least one child with a chronic illness condition reduces married 
mother’s probability of working by almost 2.5 percentage points. This is a small effect 
considering almost 72% of the mothers in the dataset are employed. The pooled OLS 
model suggests that with the existence of at least one chronically ill child, a married 
mother increases her hours of work by almost 10 years per year. However this effect is 
not significant. Considering that the married mother’s average hours of work per year are 
almost 1587 hours, this effect is almost negligible indicating no substantial change in 
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SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF 




According to the Social Security Bulletin Annual Statistical Supplement 2000, 
almost 80 percent of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients are either blind or 
disabled. The number of blind and disabled adults aged 18 to 64 on SSI has more than 
doubled since 1974, with the most rapid growth occurring after 1982. In December 2001, 
3.8 million adults aged 18 to 64 received SSI benefits, about 2.1 million more than in 
1982.
1
 In December 2009 about 4.5 million adults aged 18 to 64 received SSI benefits. 
According to the Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, the total 
amount of federal payments and state supplemental income payments in year 2000 
dollars was $31.56 billion in 2000 (0.32 % of GDP) and approximately $37.83 billion in 
2009 (0.33% of GDP). Although the effects of means-tested income support programs 
like SSI on labor supply have been widely studied in the context of pre-retirement labor 
supply of the ‘aged’ group (e.g., Neumark and Powers 2000, 2005), research on the labor 
supply of disabled or blind individuals is rare. In this study I particularly focus on the 
effects of SSI generosity on the employment decisions of the group of individuals aged 
                                                          
1
 Daly, M. and Burkhauser, R., (2002) 




18 to 64 who have severe and long term condition of blindness and/or deafness using 
Census 2000 and American Community Survey (ACS) data (2001-2009).   
If an individual is given an opportunity to increase his income with little or no 
effort then he will readily do so. Thus an individual who is eligible for cash benefits from 
the SSI program will participate in the program if the benefit he receives from the 
program is larger than the cost of program participation. More generous SSI payments 
might discourage blind or disabled people from seeking employment. On the other hand, 
the Social Security Administration has explored methods for encouraging SSI recipients 
to return to work or to increase their current work efforts. These methods include various 
provisions of the law that permit SSI recipients to keep their earnings while maintaining 
eligibility for reduced cash benefits. The incentive effects of SSI on labor supply, 
therefore, arises both because of a pure income effect of SSI benefits and because SSI 
benefits are reduced as other sources of income increase. Even if an individual is eligible 
for full SSI benefits, he or she may still choose employment due to a variety of 
psychological, social and economic factors.   
Under the SSI program, states can boost benefit levels for recipients beyond the 
uniform federal benefit level by mandatory and optional supplementation. This element 
of the SSI program introduces substantial variation in the level of benefits across states 
and over time. Given the variation of SSI payments across states and over time, this paper 
investigates the differences in being employed of the blind and/or deaf individuals in 





 1.2. Summary of SSI program  
 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a nationwide federal assistance program 
for aged, blind, and disabled individuals with low incomes. This program was enacted by 
the U.S. Congress in 1972 and began in 1974. Prior to the year 1972, three separate 
programs were established under the original Social Security Act of 1935: Old-Age 
Assistance, Aid to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. The SSI 
program established uniform eligibility criteria for all states and federal payment amounts 
that vary by marital status, living arrangement, and the income level of recipients. The 
SSI program defines individuals 65 years of age or older as aged. Blind and disabled 
people can be within any age group. A person is considered blind if he has a central 
visual acuity of 20/200 or less in his better eye with use of a correcting lens, or he has a 
visual field limitation in his better eye such that the widest diameter of the visual field 
subtends an angle no greater than 20 degrees. However, a person whose visual 
impairment is not severe enough to be considered blind may be eligible for SSI benefits 
under the disability rules. For purposes of eligibility, disabled individuals are defined as 
those who are ‘‘unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity due to a medically 
determined physical or mental impairment expected to result in death or that has lasted, 
or can be expected to last, for a continuous period of at least 12 months.’’ The monthly 
substantial gainful activity amount was $700 for non-blind individuals and $1170 for 
blind individuals in 2000. By 2009 this amount had increased to $980 for non-blind 




criteria and maximum benefit levels for individuals and couples for the federal 
component of the program. Congress imposed mandatory supplements to ensure that 
citizens already in state programs do not receive a lower benefit in the federal program 
than they had previously received under the state program. In addition to the federal 
program and the mandatory supplements, states have the option of voluntarily 
supplementing the federal grants for all or some recipients. This optional supplemental 
payment has the effect of increasing and substantially varying the available maximum 
benefit. Federal benefits are indexed to inflation, while state benefits need not be. 
Benefits are reduced by income from other sources, including social security. Under SSI 
provisions, $65 of monthly earnings are disregarded in determining the size of the benefit 
for an applicant; and for every dollar of additional earnings, SSI benefits are reduced by 
50 cents. This level of curtailment is known as the benefit reduction rate. Under the SSI 
program the first $20 of unearned income (including social security benefits) is 
disregarded and above that the SSI benefit is reduced by dollar-for-dollar with increase in 
unearned income. In addition to the income requirements, applicants must also pass an 
asset test to be considered eligible for SSI benefits. Couples must have countable assets 
valued at less than $3000 and singles must have countable assets valued at less than 
$2000 to be considered eligible. As in the case of income, several exclusions are made in 
the determination of asset holdings. The value of an owner-occupied home, a car needed 
for transportation to medical treatment or to work, life insurance valued at less than 




omitted.  Table 2.1 summarizes basic features of SSI eligibility requirements and 
exclusions. 
A state may administer its supplementary program, or it may enter into an 
arrangement under which the Social Security Administration (SSA) will make eligibility 
determinations and payments on behalf of the state. Under state administration, a state 
pays its own program benefits and absorbs the full administrative costs. If states choose 
to administer the SSI program, they are also free to set their own eligibility criteria such 
as asset limits. However, many states use the federal criteria to set the eligibility criteria.  
The SSI program has grown substantially in both recipients and expenditures 
since it first paid benefits in 1974. However, its growth has varied over time (Figure 2.4). 
The number of beneficiaries increased steadily from roughly 3.9 million in 1982 to 6.6 
million in 1996. Total annual payments (valued in 2000 dollars) increased by almost 87 
percent during this period. Between 2000 and 2009 the total number of persons receiving 
SSI benefits increased from 6.6 million to 7.7 million (16.7 percent).  Disabled and blind 
individuals in the age group of 18 to 64 are the largest share of total number of recipients 
(Figure 2.5). The total number of disabled and blind recipients in the age group of 18 to 
64 was 3.7 million in 2000 and 4.5 million in 2009. According to the Social Security 
Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, the number of working-age SSI recipients that 






1.3. Existing Literature  
 
Previous research of the impact of SSI on the employment decisions for blind or 
disabled people is limited.  People who are eligible for SSI payments are: “aged”, “blind” 
and “disabled” individuals who have little earnings, low levels of non-labor income, and 
low asset income. Most researchers have focused on the “aged” (65 years old and above 
with limited income and assets) group who are also eligible for this program.  
Neumark and Powers (2000) studied pre-eligibility-age labor market disincentives 
for the aged group (65 years old and above) created by the Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) program. Asset and income limits might induce individuals nearing the eligibility 
age to work less. They used state-level variation in the generosity of  SSI payments to 
identify the effects of SSI for the aged on labor supply as men approached the eligibility 
age (65 years)  for the program, and used data from 1984, 1990 and 1991 panels of the 
Survey of Income Program Participation (SIPP). They investigate the impact of SSI 
payment generosity on the employment of people who are nearing the age of SSI 
eligibility. People aged 60 to 64 are considered as a treatment group as the effects of SSI 
are likely to be strongest for this older group who is nearing the age of eligibility and 
people aged 40 to 59 are considered as the control group. Neumark and Powers define 
states that provide more than 20% of the federal benefit as supplements as the more 
generous states. Using a Difference-in-Differences (DD) analysis, they found some 
evidence that SSI discourages work (negative impact on employment and work hours) for 




estimates of the effects of SSI on employment are almost always negative, although the 
statistical significance of the evidence varies. Specifically, the DD estimates suggest that 
with higher generosity, the employment probability goes down by 12.5 percentage points 
more for the treatment group compared to the control group. They also estimated a 
similar disincentive effect of SSI generosity on employment and work hours using 
Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference (DDD) estimation. Their DDD estimator requires 
the assumption that state specific factors affecting the slopes of age profiles of labor 
supply are common to both likely and unlikely participants in a state. The DDD results 
indicate that more generous SSI supplements reduce the probability of being employed 
for the likely participants, aged 60 to 64 by 10 percentage points. 
In a later paper Neumark and Powers (2005) explored whether SSI (Supplemental 
Security Income) affects the labor supply of likely future SSI participants at ages 62 to 64 
over a longer period of time. Their previous work (Neumark and Powers 2000) was based 
on a small range of years with little time series variation in SSI benefits. In their 2005 
paper, the authors used 1980 to 2001 data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). 
Using DD estimation they estimate the impact of changes in SSI over time and across 
states on employment of the people aged 62 to 64. Their DD results suggest that SSI does 
discourage work: a $100 increase in monthly SSI benefits (in real 1982 dollars) by a state 
reduces the current employment probability of the people aged 62 to 64 in that state by 
1.5 percentage points compared to the state that does not increase. Neumark and Powers 
also extend their analysis to incorporate the impact of SSI generosity on the employment 




using a DDD method. People aged 60 to 61 and who have higher likelihood to participate 
in SSI program are considered as control group. Their DDD result shows that a $100 
increase in monthly SSI benefits across states and over time reduces the probability of 
being employed by 3.1 percentage points for the treatment group compared to the control 
group.  
Yelowitz (1998) examined the role of Medicaid on the SSI participation decision. 
He found that rising health insurance costs are an important reason for participation in the 
SSI-disabled program. He used March CPS data from 1988 to 1994. He observed that 
OLS estimates of Medicaid’s effect are biased because of omitted variables bias and 
measurement error. He therefore applied two-stage least squares to estimate Medicaid’s 
effect, using average Medicaid expenditure for blind SSI recipients as an instrument. 
These estimates showed that rising Medicaid expenditure significantly increased SSI 
participation among adults with low permanent incomes, explaining 20 percent of the 
growth in participation from 1987 to 1993.     
Harkness (1993) examined whether Canadian disability-related insurance 
schemes discourage work among the disabled prime-age men. This paper developed and 
estimated a simple model, where a disabled individual’s work choice depends on his or 
her labor income if working versus the disability pension expected if not working. Even 
though one might be disabled enough to be on full pension, one can still work, though not 
necessarily full time or at one’s preferred occupation. Harkness finds that a disabled 




increases. Specifically his empirical result suggests that the labor supply elasticity with 
respect to disability pension is around -2.  
In this paper, I study whether variation in SSI generosity across states and over 
time has any disincentive effect on the employment decision of blind and/or deaf people 
in the U.S. The data (Census-2000 and ACS) do not provide any information regarding 
the exact condition of a disability (according to the definition of SSA) nor do they 
indicate whether the person is considered eligible for SSI. However, the data do provide 
information about different disabilities (e.g., work disability, disability limiting mobility, 
personal care limitation, physical difficulty, severe and long-lasting blindness and/or 
deafness). Individuals might report themselves as disabled even though they are not truly 
disabled in order to justify a lack of participation in the labor force. Such a self-reporting 
issue could produce an endogeneity problem as people with adverse attitudes toward 
labor market participation will tend to report that they have some form of disability. 
Moreover, there might be financial incentives for individuals to identify themselves as 
disabled. However, the definition of the disability variable indicating blindness and/or 
deafness specifically mentions whether such disability condition is severe and long-term. 
So given that definition it might be possible to reduce the problem of self reporting and 
endogeneity. That is why I only focus on those reporting severe and long-lasting 








We can consider a simple consumption-leisure diagram (Figure-1.1) to explain 
the labor force participation decision of a blind and/or deaf individual. Without the SSI 
program the budget constraint of the individual is ABC, where AB is non-labor income.  
By introducing the SSI system into the model, the government changes the budget 
constraint. The new budget constraint of the individual is ADEC. The SSI program offers 















Figure:1.1 (SSI and Labor Supply) 
 
After a certain level of earned income, the SSI benefit is reduced by 50 cents for 

















‘benefit reduction rate’ (τ). An eligible individual can enjoy at least l amount of leisure 
under the program. In other words, if an individual works more than Al then he or she 
will not be eligible for the program. If an individual maximizes utility on the DE portion 
of the budget line, then he or she participates in the labor market and receives reduced 
SSI benefits. However if the individual gets maximum utility from the CE portion of the 
budget constraint then he or she participates in the labor market but does not receive any 
SSI benefits. If the individual maximizes utility at the corner, i.e., at point D then he or 
she does not work at all and receive the full SSI benefit. 
For simplicity, suppose an individual maximizes the following utility function: 
);,( ltlCUU  ; 0CU , 0.lU                                                  (1) 
Here, C is consumption; l is leisure, and lt  is the parameter measuring taste for leisure.  
Total income consists of labor income and non-labor income, I = Y + N, where Y 
is labor income and N is non-labor income. Assume that the length of a total time period 
is unity and wage rate is denoted by w; then Y=w (1- l). 
Suppose an eligible individual chooses not to receive SSI. The budget constraint 
of the individual without SSI program is 
(1 ) .C w l N                                                                              (2) 
The individual maximizes utility subject to budget constraint (2). The optimum 
combination of consumption and leisure are denoted wC and wl  respectively. Then the 





( , , ).w wl lV V w N t                                                                         (3) 
The budget constraint for an eligible individual under the SSI program is 
(1 )(1 )C w l N SSI     ; where,  .l l                                   (4) 
Because of the ‘benefit reduction rate’ on earned income the net wage falls to    
(1- τ) w along the initial part of the budget constraint. Any point on the DE portion of the 
budget constraint gives higher utility to an eligible individual compared to the BE portion 
of the budget constraint. If an individual maximizes utility on DE portion of the budget 
constraint
2
 then indirect utility function from working and participating in SSI program is 
represented by 
1 ( , , , , , ).
SSI SSI
l lV V w N SSI t l                                                        (5)
 
If the eligible individual chooses to not work at all and instead to receive the full SSI 
benefits then the indirect utility function is 
1 1 ( , , ).
nw nw
l l lV V N SSI t                                                                     (6)  
In order to find out the labor force participation decision of the individual, define R as the 
difference in the relevant indirect utilities, so 
1 1 1[ , ]
nw w SSI
l l lR V Max V V                                                                (7)             
                                                          
2
 An individual gets higher utility on DE compared to CE portion of the budget line. Also if we extend the 
DE portion of the budget line up to the vertical axis in Figure 1.1 then utility from CE is higher compared 
to DE portion of the budget line. So it is not clear whether the indirect utility function given by equation (5) 




An eligible individual’s decision to work or not depends on the value of R. If 
1 1 1[ , ]
nw w SSI
l l lV Max V V    i.e. 0,R  then the individual will not work at all and joins the SSI 
program; if  
1 1 1[ , ]
w SSI SSI
l l lMax V V V    and R<0, then the individual could work and receive 
SSI; and if 
1 1 1[ , ]
w SSI w
l l lMax V V V    and R<0 then he will work and not participate in the SSI 
program. 
After allowing for a random shock on indirect utility, an individual’s decision to 
work or not can be shown by the following relation where EMP denotes the work choice: 
1EMP     if 0R              (ε is a random shock) 
          = 0    otherwise 
  Pr[ 1| , , , , ] Pr[ 0 | , , , , ]l lEMP w N SSI t R w N SSI t                                                                   
For empirical purposes I consider the difference in the relevant indirect utilities 
(R) as a function of SSI, individual and family characteristics (X), state level economic 
factors (Z), and other state and time fixed effects (µ and η respectively): 
* .ist ist ist ist ist st s t istR Y SSI X Z                    
Here 
*
istY is an unobserved latent random variable representing the difference in indirect 
utilities. Given the above framework the probability of employment can be expressed as 
follows: 
Pr[ 1| , , ]
Pr[ 0 | , , ].ist ist st s t ist
EMP SSI X Z
SSI X Z SSI X Z      

           





Thus the probability of an individual being employed depends on several factors 
such as labor market environment and opportunities, individual and family characteristics 
(e.g., taste for leisure, age, gender, race, marital status, education status, and other factors 























EFFECTS OF SSI GENEROSITY ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE 
BLIND AND DEAF: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
 




I use data from the US Census 2000 (5% sample) and the American Community 
Survey for the years 2001 to 2009. This rich data set is the major source of individual 
specific information required for this paper. I have restricted my sample to the age group 
of 18 to 64 for those who have severe and long-lasting condition of blindness and/or 
deafness. I also restricted the sample to only non-group-quarters households. State-level 
data for maximum SSI benefits are collected from the official website of the U.S. Social 
Security Administration. State-level average monthly Medicaid payments to blind 
individuals are collected from the official website of the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services. State level unemployment rates are collected from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics.  Both the Census and the ACS report the SSI receipt of an individual in 
the previous year. The 2000 census collected information on income received from this 
source during the previous calendar year; for the ACS the reference period was the past 
12 months. The employment status of the current year is reported through the variable 
“empstatd” in the data. Here, respondents are to report their employment status as it 




variable (employed or not) is a dichotomous variable, and it is based on current 
employment status. I also use annual hours of work and worked or not in the previous 
calendar year as alternative measures of labor supply. Education status is divided into 
four groups: less than high school graduate, high school graduate, some college (1 to 3 
years of college) and college or more (four years college and more). I create two marital 
status categories: ‘single’ (widowed or divorced or never married or separated) and 
‘married’ (married and spouse present or married and spouse absent). Table 2.2 reports 
the summary statistics for this sample of blind and/or deaf individuals. Almost 49 percent 
of the blind and/or deaf individuals are employed. Almost 22% of the prime age (18 to 
64) blind and/or deaf individuals are high school dropouts, 43% are high school graduates 
and 21% of individuals have 1 to 3 years of college education. There is substantial 
variation in SSI benefits across states and over time. On average, the monthly maximum 
SSI benefit is almost $603 in real 2000 dollars. Table 2.3 reports the variation in real 
monthly maximum SSI benefits over time, by state. Between the years 2000 and 2009 the 
maximum SSI benefits in real 2000 dollars increased by more than 11% in some states 
like Virginia and Texas. However other states like Nevada and New Mexico the 
maximum SSI benefits increased by less than 1.2% over the same period. State level 
monthly maximum SSI benefits (real 2000 dollars) are shown in Appendix C. The states 
like Georgia, West Virginia and Utah provide less than $530 in SSI benefits (varies 
between $510 to $526 in real 2000 dollars) while states like Virginia, South Carolina and 
Iowa provide more than $800 in SSI benefits (varies between $805 to $922 in real 2000 




highest benefits over this period. I evaluate both cross-section (across states) and time-
series (within-state) variation in SSI benefits. The lowest percentage changes (in absolute 
terms) between 2000 and 2009 occur in Delaware, Missouri, Massachusetts, Nevada, and 
Rhode Island; the highest percentage change (in absolute terms) of the benefits occurs in 
Kansas, Virginia, Washington, and Texas. Table 2.4 reports the variation in real (in 2000 
dollars) average monthly Medicaid expenditure for states. The employment rate and SSI 
program participation rate for all blind and/or deaf people are shown in Table 2.5. Overall 
the SSI program participation rate is almost 12 percent among the prime age blind and/or 
deaf individuals. As education level increases, the SSI program participation rate 




Let Yist =1 if the individual i in state s and in time t is employed (i.e., EMP=1) and 
0 otherwise. To estimate the effects of SSI generosity across states and over time on the 
probability of employment of blind and/or deaf individuals in a linear probability model 
framework, the empirical model can be reconstructed as follows: 
Pr( 1| , , ) ( , , , , )ist ist ist st s tY SSI X Z f SSI X Z     
Pr( 0 | , , ) 1 ( , , , , )ist ist ist st s tY SSI X Z f SSI X Z      
( | , , )
( , , , , )
.
ist
ist ist st s t
ist ist st s t
E Y SSI X Z
f SSI X Z
SSI X Z
 
     






Therefore the linear probability of employment model can be written as follows: 
            
( | , , ) [ ( | , , )]ist ist ist istY E Y SSI X Z Y E Y SSI X Z                 
 
.ist ist ist st s t istY SSI X Z                                          (8) 
In this model µs captures the unobserved state specific effects and ηt captures the 
unobserved time specific effects. The coefficient on SSI gives the biased estimation of 
the effect of SSI on employment because unobserved state specific effects and time 
specific effects contaminate the true effects of SSI benefits on employment. In order to 
get an unbiased estimate of SSI benefits on employment I include state dummies and time 
dummies in the model. The change in the employment probability due to unobserved 
state-specific effects are captured by state dummies and change in the employment 
probability due to unobserved year-specific effects are captured by year dummies. The 
difference-in-difference estimation method eliminates the biased result (arising from the 
state specific and time specific effects) using state dummy and year dummy variables in 
the model. 
 
So the research methodology is difference-in-difference (DD) estimation. This 
entails estimating equation (9) for multiple years, with state dummy variables (STATE) to 
capture the state-level differences, and year dummy variables (YEAR) to capture common 
changes over time, as in  




Here the subscript “i” indexes an individual, “s” indexes the state, and “t” indexes 
the time. The time dummy is denoted by “YEAR” and the state dummy is denoted by 
“STATE”. X is a vector of individual-specific variables like non-labor income, income of 
the rest of the family, age, sex, education status, marital status, and race. The vector Z 
includes state-level average monthly Medicaid expenditure and state labor market factors 
like the unemployment rate. This DD method uses time-series observations from different 
periods in the same state and from different states in the same period to generate the 
control group. In this model, the coefficient π captures the effects of all the observed and 
unobserved state-specific time-invariant factors that can potentially affect the labor 
supply. On the other hand, the coefficient ρ captures the effects of all the time varying 
factors (common to all states) that affect the labor supply. The purpose of this DD 
method is to eliminate the effects of time-varying factors common to all states and the 
unobserved state-specific time-invariant factors that can vary with changes in SSI and 
therefore might impact the probability of being employed. Existence of these effects may 
contaminate the true impact of SSI generosity and may bias the impact of SSI in absence 
of the DD approach.  The methodology to identify the true impact of SSI benefits on the 
probability of being employed using the DD approach is illustrated below:  
Suppose for simplicity, there are two states (A and B) and two years (2001 and 
2002). State A increases the SSI benefits (by $100 per month) while state B does not 
increase the benefits over the time periods (from year 2001 to 2002). Following are 




In year 2001, the expected probabilities of employment for an individual in the two states 
are: 
2001 ,2001 2001( | , , )iA A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
2001 ,2001 2001( | , , )iB B iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2001) are given by: 
2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI                                                                
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
blind and/ or deaf individual between state A and state B in the year 2001. 
 
In 2002, the expected probabilities of employment for an individual in the two states are: 
2002 ,2002 2002( | , , )iA A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
2002 ,2002 2002( | , , )iB B iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2002) are given by: 
2002.( )iA iBSSI SSI    
The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
blind and/or deaf individuals between state A and state B in the year 2002.  
The difference between Δ2001 and Δ2002 gives following expression and the coefficient α 




2001 2002 2001 2002.[( ) ( )]iA iA iB iBSSI SSI SSI SSI     
 Therefore α is the key coefficient of interest as it identifies the effects of SSI on 
changes in probability of being employed of blind and/or deaf people over time across 
states with changes in SSI benefit generosity. If there is any evidence that increase in SSI 
generosity creates work disincentive then α should be negative.  
I also use the following Differences-in-Differences-in-Differences (DDD) 
estimation method to address the possibility of another bias. This bias arises if there are 
some unobserved factors that affect employment behavior of the blind and/ or deaf 
people differently for a state that increased SSI in some particular year more compared to 
a state that increased SSI less. For example if a greater increase in SSI benefits in South 
Carolina (SC) in a given year changes the labor market attitudes of the blind and/or deaf 
individuals in SC differently than those in North Carolina (NC) in response to smaller 
increase in SSI benefits in NC, then simple DD estimate will produce biased effect of SSI 
generosity on employment. To correct this bias, I form within-state treatment and 
comparison groups, assuming that any change in labor market attitudes due to a change in 
SSI benefits in a given state and year is the same for both the groups. I construct four 
different treatment and control groups. The treatment groups are high school (HS) 
dropout blind and/or deaf people, HS graduate blind and/or deaf people, blind and/or deaf 
people with some college education (1 to 3 years) and blind and/or deaf people with four 
years and more college education. The control groups corresponding to these treatment 
groups are HS dropout non-blind individuals, HS graduate non-blind individuals, non-




respectively. The purpose of the DDD method is to eliminate the effects of the 
unobserved factors that affect employment behavior of the blind and/ or deaf people 
differently for a state that increased SSI in some particular year more compared to a state 
that increased SSI less. Existence of those effects may contaminate the true impact of SSI 
generosity and may bias the impact of SSI in absence of the DDD approach. To eliminate 
that bias I take the difference of the employment probabilities between the treatment and 
comparison groups for any given state and time period. The methodology to identify the 
true impact of SSI benefits on the probability of being employed using the DDD 
approach is illustrated below: 
*ist ist ist ist ist is it ist is
ist it ist st ist
Y SSI SSI T T STATE YEAR T STATE
T YEAR X Z
     
   
      
   
                (10)
 
Once again, suppose for simplicity, there are two states (A and B) and two years 
(2001 and 2002). State A increases the SSI benefits (by $100 per month) while state B 
does not increase the benefits over the time periods (from year 2001 to 2002). The 
variable “T” is the treatment group indicator. In this model, θ captures fixed differences 
across states between the demographic treatment and the comparison groups. Multiple δ’s 
capture differences in the common time-series changes in labor supply for the treatment 
and the control group. Following are possible cases to illustrate the DDD effect: 
In 2001, the expected probability of employment for the treatment group in the two 
states: 




2001 2001 2001 2001( | , , )iB iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z                
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2001,T) are given by: 
2001 2001( ) ( )iA iB iA iBSSI SSI SSI SSI                                                                   
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
treatment group between state A and state B in the year 2001.  
In 2001, the expected probability of employment for the control group in the two states: 
2001 2001 2001( | , , )iA i A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z            
2001 2001 2001( | , , )iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2001,C) are given by: 
2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI                                                                
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
control group between state A and state B in the year 2001.  
The difference between the changes in the expected probability of being employment 





2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI    
 In 2002, the expected probability of being employment for the treatment group in the 
two states: 
2002 2002 2002 2002( | , , )iA iA iA iAE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z                
2002 2002 2002 2002( | , , )iB iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z            
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2002,T) are given by: 
2002 2002( ) ( )iA iB iA iBSSI SSI SSI SSI                                                                   
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
treatment group between state A and state B in the year 2002.  
In 2002, the expected probability of being employment for the control group in the two 
states: 
2002 2002 2002( | , , )iA i A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
2002 2002 2002( | , , )iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
Taking the difference between the expected probabilities of the above two (Δ2002,C) are 
given by: 




 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
control group between state A and state B in the year 2002.  
The difference between the changes in the expected probability of being employment 
between the treatment and control group in year 2002 is given by the following 
expression (DD2): 
2002.( )iA iBSSI SSI    
The difference between DD1 and DD2 gives following DDD effect: 
2001 2002 2001 2002.[( ) ( )]iA iA iB iBSSI SSI SSI SSI     
The DDD estimator β then measures the difference in the change in labor supply 
of treated group versus control group due to the changes in SSI benefits. I construct 
different treatment groups and control groups based on education categories. For 
example, I define High School (HS) dropout blind and/or deaf people as the treatment 
group as this group is most likely to be in the SSI program and hence the most likely to 
be affected by changes in SSI. The control group corresponding to this group is HS 
dropout non-blind individuals. Similarly I consider HS graduate, some-college and 
college-graduate blind and/or deaf individuals to form other treatment groups.  In all 
these cases non-blind individuals with similar education level are considered as control 





2.2. Regression Results 
 
The difference-in-difference estimation results for all blind and/or deaf 
individuals are shown in Table 2.6. Here the coefficient of interest is the state level 
monthly maximum SSI benefit variable. This coefficient has the expected negative sign. 
The result suggests that the probability that a blind and/or deaf individual is employed 
goes down by 0.4 percentage points in states that increase monthly maximum SSI benefit 
by $100 over time compared to the states that do not increase their maximum SSI 
benefits. This estimated effect of the monthly maximum SSI benefit on employment is 
small, considering almost 49% blind and/or deaf people are employed. However, this 
estimated effect is statistically insignificant. More interestingly, even the confidence 
interval suggests almost negligible effect of SSI generosity on the probability of 
employment. Specifically, the standard error of the estimated coefficient is 0.005 which 
implies a 95% confidence interval for the range of the effect is between -1.45 and 0.65 
percentage points. Given the employment rate of 49%, this confidence interval reflects a 
substantially small impact of SSI generosity.  
Additionally, the estimated model shows that if Medicaid expenditure increases 
by $100 per month then probability of being employed goes up by 0.14 percentage 
points. Non-labor income has significantly negative impact and rest of the family income 
has significantly negative impact on the probability of being employed. The state level 
unemployment rate which indicates labor market opportunity, has expected negative 




probability of being employed compared to married individuals. The more educated the 
individual is the higher the likelihood of being employed. Males are more likely to be 
employed compared to females. Blacks are less likely to be employed than whites and 
others.  
I have also estimated the DD model using alternative definition of labor supply 
such as whether individual worked or not in the last year and annual hours of works in 
the last year. When I consider the dependent variable worked or not in the last year, the 
overall DD effect of main coefficient of interest for the sample of all blind and/or deaf 
individuals suggest a decline of employment by 0.2 percentage points. More 
interestingly, even the confidence interval suggests an almost negligible effect of SSI 
generosity on the probability of employment. Specifically, the standard error of the 
estimated coefficient is 0.008 which implies the range of the effect is between -0.02 and 
0.01 percentage points. When I use hours of work per year as dependent variable, I find 
that a $100 increase in maximum SSI benefits per month reduces hours of work of all 
blind and/or deaf individuals by only 4 hours per year. This is a negligible effect 
considering the average hours of work per year are almost 1767 hours. Also the 95% 
confidence interval ranges between -20.16 to 11.78. The regression results are reported in 
table D5 and table D6 in the appendix.  
Table 2.7 displays the DD estimation result of the main coefficient (corresponding 
to maximum SSI benefit) of interest when same regression specifications (as in table 2.6) 
are estimated for different demographic groups. The effects found in most of the 




Specifically, for a married blind and/or deaf individual, I find that a $100 increase in 
monthly maximum SSI benefits will decrease the probability of being employed by 1 
percentage point. It can be noted that almost 55% blind and/or deaf individuals of this 
demographic group are employed and the standard error (0.007) suggests that the range 
of the effect is between -2.27 and 0.56 percentage points.  The main coefficient of interest 
for both white and single-white groups suggests that the probability of being employed 
goes down by 0.7 percentage points due to $100 increase in monthly maximum SSI 
benefit. The DD effects of married-white and white-male suggest that probability of labor 
force participation goes down by 0.8 percentage points. I find positive, insignificant DD 
effect for the demographic groups black, black-married, single-black, black-male, and 
single.  Among these categories, the estimated effect of the monthly maximum SSI 
benefit on employment is relatively larger for black males when I restrict the sample only 
to black males. The result suggests that the probability of being employed of the black 
males goes up by 2.2 percentage points in states that increase monthly maximum SSI 
benefit by $100 over time compared to the states that do not increase their maximum SSI 
benefits. This estimated effect is insignificant and small, considering almost 37% blind 
and/or deaf individuals of this category are employed. Specifically, the standard error of 
the estimated coefficient is 0.019 which implies the range of the effect is between -1.6 
and 6.1 percentage points. However, the DD estimation for the restricted sample of black 
females suggests that their probability of being employed goes down by 0.6 percentage 
points in response to a $100 increase in maximum monthly SSI benefits. In a nutshell, the 




of being employed: specifically, for married, married-white, and white-male blind and/or 
deaf individuals the estimated negative effects of the $100 increase in SSI benefits on the 
probability of employment are larger (-0.9, -0.8, and -0.77 percentage points 
respectively). However, none of them are statistically significant at 5 percent level of 
significance. 
I have also estimated separate regression models for different demographic groups 
using alternative definition of labor force participation (worked or not in the last year and 
hours of works per year in the last year). Using worked or not in the last year as a 
dependent variable I find a relatively larger negative impact of SSI benefits on labor force 
participation. Specifically for single-black individuals I find that employment probability 
goes down by almost 3 percentage points. For the white individuals I find that 
employment probability goes down by almost 1 percentage point. However this is a small 
effect considering the employment rate for the white is almost 67 percent. Using annual 
hours of work as a dependent variable, the DD effect of main coefficient for different 
demographic groups also suggest a small negative effect of the SSI benefit on work 
hours. Specifically, single-black individuals reduce their hours of work by almost 33 
hours per year and married individuals reduce their hours of work by almost 14 hours per 
year in response to a $100 increase in maximum monthly SSI benefits.  All the DD 
estimates for different groups suggest that a $100 increase in maximum monthly SSI 
benefits does little to reduce employment.
3
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 The estimated results of these demographic groups under alternative definition of labor force participation 




Table 2.8 shows the difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimation 
results for the treatment group HS dropout blind and/or deaf and control group HS 
dropout non-blind individuals. The coefficient of interest is the interaction term of the 
treatment group and the maximum SSI benefit levels. The estimated coefficient of that 
interaction term suggests that for blind and/or deaf HS dropouts the probability of being 
employed goes down by 4 percentage points more than non-blind HS dropouts in states 
that increase monthly maximum SSI benefits by $100 over time compared to the states 
that do not increase. This is the largest effect in this study. The standard error of the 
estimated coefficient is 0.020 which implies that for a 95% confidence interval the range 
of the effect is between -0.0792 and 0.0023. For the same combination of the treatment 
and comparison group, estimation result of hours of work per year as a dependent 
variable (table D7 in appendix) suggests that HS dropout blind individuals reduce hours 
of work per year by almost 29 hours per year compared to the HS dropout non-blind 
individuals. This is also a small effect considering the average annual hours of work for 
these blind and/or deaf is almost 1685 hours.  
Using HS dropout blind and/or deaf as treatment group and HS dropout non-blind 
as control group the same regression models of employment probability are estimated for 
different demographic groups (based on race, gender and marital status). These DDD 
results of main coefficient of interest are reported in table D1 in the appendix. For most 
of the demographic groups I find negative effect of SSI generosity on probability of being 
employed. The largest negative impact is for the high school dropout male blind and/or 




probability of being employed goes down by 4.5 percentage points for HS dropout blind 
and/or deaf male compared to HS dropout non-blind male. The DDD result for the white-
male group suggests that probability of being employed goes down by 4.4 percentage 
points for HS dropout white-male compared to HS dropout non-blind white-male.  
Table 2.9 shows the difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) estimation 
results where HS graduate blind and/or deaf individuals are considered as treatment 
group and HS graduate non-blind individuals are considered as control group. The DDD 
estimated result of the main coefficient of interest  suggests that the probability of being 
employed for blind and/or deaf HS graduates goes down by 0.9 percentage points more 
than non-blind HS graduates in states that increase monthly maximum SSI benefits by 
$100 over time compared to the states that do not increase. Using annual hours of work 
as a dependent variable I find that HS graduate blind individuals reduce their hours of 
work by 19 hours per year compared to the HS graduate non-blind individuals. The result 
is shown in table D7 in the appendix. Using HS graduate blind and/or deaf as treatment 
group and HS graduate non-blind as control group the same regression models are 
estimated for different demographic groups (based on race, gender and marital status) 
separately and DDD results of main coefficient of interest are reported in table D2 in the 
appendix. Except the demographic group black-male I find negative effect of SSI 
generosity on probability of being employment for all other demographic groups. The 
largest negative impact of SSI benefit on employment is for the high school graduate 
black-female blind and/or deaf individuals. Specifically for this group the DDD effect 




graduate blind and/or deaf black-female compared to HS graduate non-blind black-
female.  
Table 2.10 shows the DDD estimation result where I consider blind and/or deaf 
individuals with some college (1-3 years college education) as treatment group and non-
blind individuals with some college as a control group. The estimated result of the main 
coefficient of interest suggests that the probability of being employed for blind and/or 
deaf with some-college goes up by 0.4 percentage points more than non-blind individuals 
with some-college in a states that increase monthly maximum SSI benefits by $100 over 
time compared to the states that do not increase. This estimated effect is negligible 
considering the standard error of 0.01. Using annual hours of work as a dependent 
variable I find that blind individuals with some college reduce their hours of work by 
almost 3 hours per year compared to the non-blind individuals with some college. This 
negative effect on annual work hours is also negligible and insignificant. This result is 
shown in table D7 in the appendix.  
Finally, the DDD estimation result for the treatment group college graduate (4 
years and more) blind and the control group college graduate non-blind are reported in 
table 2.11. Once again, the estimated result of the main coefficient of interest suggests 
that the probability of being employed for blind and/or deaf with college-graduate goes 
up by 0.02 percentage points more than non-blind individuals with some-college in a 
states that increase monthly maximum SSI benefits by $100 over time compared to the 
states that do not increase. This is again a very small negligible and statistically 




precise enough. Using annual hours of work as a dependent variable I also find 
statistically insignificant and less precise impact of SSI benefits on annual hours of work. 
This result is shown in table D7 in the appendix. Using college-graduate blind as 
treatment group and college graduate non-blind as control group the same regressions are 
run for different demographic groups (based on race, gender and marital status) 
separately and DDD results of main coefficient of interest are reported in table D4 in the 
appendix. The largest negative impact is for the college graduate married-white blind 
and/or deaf individuals. Specifically for this group the DDD effect suggests that for 
college graduate blind and/or deaf married-white probability of being employed goes 
down by almost 3 percentage points compared to college graduate non-blind married-
white in response to a $100 increase in monthly SSI benefits. The effect is substantially 





In this paper I examine whether cross-state and time-series variation in 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) generosity has any disincentive effect on the 
employment decisions of prime age (18 to 64) blind and/or deaf people. I use an 
individual level model with state and time fixed effects and Difference-in-Difference 
(DD) method to investigate it. Using data from Census 2000 and ACS (2001 to 2009), I 




deaf individuals together, I find that the probability of being employed goes down by 
only 0.4 percentage points in states that increase their monthly maximum SSI benefits by 
$100 (about a 17 percent increases) over time compared to the states that do not increase 
their benefit levels. However, using the same individual level model and DD method for 
different demographic groups, I find larger reduction on labor force participation 
decision. Specifically, for a married blind and/or deaf individual, I find that a $100 
increase in monthly maximum SSI benefits will decrease the probability of being 
employed by 1 percentage point. Using difference-in-differences-in-differences (DDD) 
method and considering the treatment group HS dropout blind and/or deaf and 
comparison group HS dropout non-blind I find the largest impact in this study. The DDD 
result suggests that a $100 increase in monthly maximum SSI benefits will reduce the 
probability of being employed for blind HS dropouts by 4 percentage points compared to 
the non-blind HS dropouts. Using alternative definition of labor supply (worked or not in 
the last year and annual hours of work in the last year) I also find small impact of SSI 
generosity on labor force participation decision. Grouping all blind and/or deaf 
individuals together I find that a $100 increase in maximum SSI benefits per month 
reduces annual hours of work by only 4 hours. This is a very small effect considering the 
average hours of work per year are almost 1767 hours. The 95% confidence interval is 
narrowing between -20.16 to 11.76.  Using the dependent variable worked or not in the 
last year I find that probability of being employed goes down by 0.2 percentage points. 
More interestingly, even the 95% confidence interval suggests almost negligible effect of 




estimated coefficient is 0.008 which implies the range of the effect is between 0.02 and 
0.01 percentage points.  Overall, from the point of view of policy prescription, SSI 
program is effective in the sense that theoretical increases in generosity do not create 
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Table 2.1: SSI at a glance (2002) 
Requirement Definition Exceptions/Exclusions 
Limited 
Income 
Countable income must be: 
 
Below $780 a month for single adult or child. 
 
Below $1,170 a month for couple 
 
(In states that pay SSI supplements, countable income 
can be higher) 
Not all income counts. 
 
Some exclusions are: 
 
$20 per month of most unearned income 
$65 per month of wages and one-half of 
wages over $65 
Food stamps 





other assets a 
person owns) 
 
$2000 for single adult or child 
 
$3000 for couple (limit applies even if only one 
member is eligible) 
 
Not all resources count 
 
Some exclusions are: 
 
the home person lives in ; 
a car ; depending on user or value, 
burial plots for individual and 
immediate family ; 
burial funds up to $1500 ; 





resides in one of the 50 states, Washington, D.C. or the 
Northern Mariana Islands; and U.S. citizen or national; 
or 
 
U.S. citizen or national; or 
Certain American Indians; or 
Lawful permanent residents with 40 work credits; or 
Certain noncitizens with a military service connection; 
or 
Certain refugee or asylee-type noncitizens during the 
first seven years; or 




Exception to residence: 
 
Certain children of U.S. armed forces 









Meet only one of these: 
 
Age 65 or older 
 
Corrected vision of 20/200 or less in better eye  
Field of vision less than 20 degrees 
 
Physical or mental impairment that keeps a person 
from performing any “substantial” work and is 
expected to last 12 months or result in death 
 
A child’s impairment must result in “marked and 
severe functional limitations” and must be expected to 
last 12 months or result in death 
 
Person whose visual impairment  is not 
severe enough to be considered blind 
may qualify under the non-blind 
disability rules: 
 
A job that pays $780 per month ($1300 
if blind) is generally considered 
substantial work 
Special work incentives allow some 
income and resources to be excluded 
and permit payment of special cash 
benefits or continuation of Medicaid 
coverage even when a blind or disabled 
person is working. 
For a couple, part of the income and resources of the spouse are considered in determining eligibility. 
If a child under age 18 is living with parents, then part of the parents’ income and resources are considered. 
 




Table 2.2: Summary Statistics: (All Blind and/ or Deaf Individuals) 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. 
Age 561372 47.80 12.24 
Non Labor Income ( $1000) 561372 5.73 14.99 
Rest of the Family Income ($1000) 561372 23.97 37.71 







Less than HS 22.02 
HS Graduate  42.91 
Some college (1 to 3 years) 21.33 
Employed 49.11 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: Non Labor Income is defined as Total personal income minus wage income minus all welfare income minus 
business income. Rest of the family income is defined as Total family income minus Total personal income. I consider 
two marital status categories: ‘single’ (widowed, divorced, never married, and separated) and ‘married’ (married and 
spouse present, married and spouse absent). The dependent variable (employed or not) is a dichotomous variable and it 
is based on current employment status. Omitted category for education is "4 years and more college” and omitted 
category for race is ‘other race’   
                                                                                                                   
 
State level Variable Obs. Mean Std.  Dev. 
SSI benefit ( monthly) 510 602.89 102.03 
Average Medicaid (monthly) 510 1030.66 343.80 
Sate level Unemployment Rate 510 5.20 1.67 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: SSI benefit is the maximum monthly benefit for blind and they are in real 2000 US dollar value. The maximum 
SSI benefits are collected from the official website of the US Social Security Administration. Medicaid expenditure is 
the average monthly Medicaid payments to blind/disabled individuals and this is also measured in real 2000 US dollar. 





Table 2.3: Variation in Real Monthly SSI Benefits over Time across States (in %) 
 Percentage change over the period  Percentage change over the period 
State  & D.C 2000-2004 2005-2009 2000-2009 State 2000-2004 2005-2009 2000-2009 
Alabama -0.83 3.84 2.66 Montana -1.29 3.16 1.39 
Alaska -3.68 -0.47 -5.17 Nebraska 1.48 4.39 5.27 
Arizona -0.97 3.63 2.27 Nevada -1.48 2.88 0.86 
Arkansas 0.14 5.23 5.31 New Hampshire -0.32 6.51 5.97 
California 3.65 1.11 3.82 New Jersey -0.28 2.93 2.56 
Colorado -0.48 4.62 1.86 New Mexico -1.37 3.05 1.18 
Connecticut -7.35 1.90 -8.10 New York -1.20 3.29 1.64 
Delaware -1.84 2.34 -0.12 North Carolina -1.33 3.10 1.28 
D.C -3.32 18.25 13.21 North Dakota 0.14 5.23 5.31 
Florida -1.08 3.46 1.95 Ohio 0.14 5.23 5.31 
Georgia 0.14 8.36 8.44 Oklahoma -1.73 3.81 1.41 
Hawaii -0.81 8.36 7.41 Oregon -0.32 4.58 4.06 
Idaho -0.71 4.15 3.12 Pennsylvania -5.15 4.56 -1.00 
Illinois 0.14 5.23 5.31 Rhode Island -1.99 1.42 -0.90 
Indiana -0.24 4.69 4.27 South Carolina -3.59 12.83 7.63 
Iowa -0.15 4.81 4.50 South Dakota -0.12 4.86 4.59 
Kansas 0.14 10.23 10.31 Tennessee 0.14 5.23 5.31 
Kentucky -2.18 1.84 -1.05 Texas -0.12 11.71 11.42 
Louisiana 0.00 5.03 4.92 Utah 0.09 5.15 5.16 
Maine -0.03 4.98 4.83 Vermont -1.69 4.01 1.96 
Maryland -0.91 3.71 2.42 Virginia -3.55 14.24 11.89 
Massachusetts -1.95 2.18 -0.42 Washington -1.96 -8.99 -11.28 
Michigan -2.17 1.84 -1.04 West Virginia 0.14 5.23 5.31 
Minnesota -1.12 6.64 1.85 Wisconsin -1.16 3.36 1.75 
Mississippi 0.14 5.23 5.31 Wyoming -0.03 7.30 7.15 
Missouri -2.01 2.08 -0.60     
 
Note: SSI benefit is the maximum monthly benefit for blind and they are in real 2000 US dollar value. The maximum 









Table 2.4: Variation in Monthly Medicaid Expenditure over time across states (%) 
 Percentage change over the period  Percentage change over the period 
State  & D.C 2000-2004 2005-2008 2000-2008 State 2000-2004 2005-2008 2000-2008 
Alabama 18.97 -7.38 22.36 Montana 9.13 -4.02 13.23 
Alaska 27.35 -17.58 17.64 Nebraska -5.17 -9.61 21.98 
Arizona 19.38 0.26 28.04 Nevada -17.97 -11.67 18.14 
Arkansas 17.80 2.60 32.56 New Hampshire -20.23 -11.61 -26.06 
California 24.50 -2.28 25.61 New Jersey 22.54 -9.56 26.15 
Colorado -6.11 0.25 3.67 New Mexico 35.76 2.62 40.60 
Connecticut 6.38 -9.14 0.08 New York 7.24 -1.24 15.93 
Delaware -6.23 4.89 5.50 North Carolina 9.76 -8.87 17.95 
D.C 4.38 -2.93 16.64 North Dakota -3.23 -13.22 7.97 
Florida 14.64 -8.78 11.24 Ohio 10.95 -18.88 -0.46 
Georgia 34.34 -15.32 20.07 Oklahoma 1.15 5.92 21.57 
Hawaii 20.51 15.49 52.31 Oregon 7.35 -8.60 12.61 
Idaho 5.80 -7.33 7.73 Pennsylvania 13.30 -13.34 13.05 
Illinois -2.71 -17.34 -15.26 Rhode Island -12.04 -10.19 -8.69 
Indiana -8.98 -10.90 -5.47 South Carolina -8.74 -11.42 -9.40 
Iowa 24.64 -7.96 29.90 South Dakota 17.09 -13.01 3.32 
Kansas 2.38 -11.47 5.07 Tennessee 64.32 -22.04 43.09 
Kentucky 7.08 -7.48 3.07 Texas -8.53 -8.60 -0.83 
Louisiana 10.80 4.67 27.77 Utah 2.93 -19.67 -11.74 
Maine 19.34 -20.86 -36.66 Vermont 15.79 -16.41 9.46 
Maryland 15.97 -0.36 28.69 Virginia 4.22 -2.02 20.96 
Massachusetts 5.06 -20.47 -7.42 Washington 41.02 5.97 45.38 
Michigan 66.49 -10.60 39.06 West Virginia 6.42 -12.98 15.48 
Minnesota 10.45 5.02 25.85 Wisconsin 5.29 -24.89 -15.58 
Mississippi 11.79 0.57 24.86 Wyoming 12.28 9.44 43.39 
Missouri 1.03 -13.41 -3.98     
 
Source: Medicaid expenditure data are collected from the official website of Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidDataSourcesGenInfo/MSIS”). Medicaid expenditure is the average monthly 








Table 2.5: Employment Rate and SSI Participation Rate (all blind and/or deaf) 
 




HS Graduate Some College 4 years and 
more college  
Year 
% Employed 50.27 30.03 50.33 61.41 71.07 2000 
% SSI Program  12.06 21.16 11.43 7.08 4.59 2000 
% Employed 49.17 29.14 48.47 58.29 68.96 2001 
% SSI Program  12.49 23 11.87 7.85 4.46 2001 
% Employed 48.88 28.56 47.75 58.98 67.92 2002 
% SSI Program  12.33 22.69 12.44 7.11 4.03 2002 
% Employed 47.66 28.03 47.68 56.63 66.47 2003 
% SSI Program  12.98 22.39 13.2 7.51 5.02 2003 
% Employed 47.12 28.2 46.15 56.02 67.73 2004 
% SSI Program  12.4 22.99 12.36 6.6 4.04 2004 
% Employed 47.63 30.07 47.1 54.6 67.43 2005 
% SSI Program  13.26 22.53 13.37 8.57 4.96 2005 
% Employed 47.89 29.08 47.28 56.87 66.57 2006 
% SSI Program  13.83 23.99 14 8.31 5.37 2006 
% Employed 46.69 28.5 45.33 55.16 66.22 2007 
% SSI Program  14.1 24.12 14.4 9.14 5.18 2007 
% Employed 52.01 32.73 51.03 59.52 70.26 2008 
% SSI Program  12.17 22.17 12.72 7.55 3.79 2008 
% Employed 48.02 30.12 46.60 54.93 66.99 2009 
% SSI Program  12.93 23.91 13.04 8.18 4.47 2009 
 




Table 2.6: Difference-in-Difference Estimation of being Employed for all Blind 
and/or Deaf Individuals (Dependent Variable: Employed or not)
4
 
Linear Probability Model 
Variables Coefficients Robust S.E 
Max SSI benefit  in $100 -0.0040 0.005 
Medicaid in $100 0.0014 0.001 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -0.0063 0.0004 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.0003 0.00004 
Age 0.0185 0.001 
Age square -0.0003 8.46e
-06
 
Male 0.1310 0.003 
High School 0.1610 0.005 
Some College 0.2550 0.005 
College or more 0.3773 0.006 
Marital status-single -0.1159 0.002 
White 0.0535 0.007 
Black -0.0533 0.009 
Unemployment rate -0.0099 0.002 
Constant 0.1100 0.035 
R-sq. 0.17  
 
Sample size is: 561372. State dummies, year dummies are included in the regression but coefficients for those dummies 
are not reported in this table. Omitted category for education is HS dropout and the omitted category for race dummy is 
the other race. Here SSI benefit is the state level monthly maximum SSI generosity. Medicaid benefit is the state level 
monthly Medicaid expenditure. Here marital status ‘single’ includes widowed, divorced, never married  and separated 
and omitted category is ‘married’ and it consists of married and spouse present, married and spouse absent. Standard 






                                                          
4 I have also estimated a Probit model using the same specification and the marginal effect of the main coefficient of 
interest (maximum SSI benefit in $100) is -0.0043 with the standard error 0.005. This bootstrap simulation is done for 
100 replications. The main coefficient of interest corresponding to the dependent variable worked last year or not is -
0.002 with the robust SE 0.008. Regression results for different definitions of the dependent variable are shown in 




Table 2.7: DD Main coefficients for different demographic groups                                                         
(Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E Employment 
Rate 
Male -0.0045 0.007 53.93 
Female -0.0036 0.006 41.45 
White -0.0067 0.006 51.34 
Black 0.0076 0.015 35.6 
Single 0.0010 0.006 42.48 
Married -0.0086 0.007 54.56 
Married-White -0.0082 0.008 56.12 
Married-Black 0.0067 0.020 44.57 
Single-White -0.0066 0.009 45.62 
Single-Black 0.0045 0.018 31.72 
Black-Male 0.0224 0.019 37.09 
Black-Female -0.0057 0.020 34.2 
White-Male -0.0077 0.008 56.66 
White-Female -0.0053 0.007 43.6 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on maximum SSI benefits where separate regressions like table 2.6 are estimated for 
each of the demographic group. Standard errors are clustered by state. Table D8 and D9 in the appendix report the DD 
main coefficient of interest for alternative definition of dependent variable (hours of work per year and worked or not 














Table 2.8: DDD Estimation of being Employed for Blind and/or Deaf Individuals 
(Treatment Group: HS dropout blind) (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 
 
Control Group (HS 
Dropout Non-blind) 
Variables Coeff. Robust S.E 
Treated*SSI -0.0384 0.020 
SSI benefit  in $100 0.0444 0.022 
Medicaid in $100 0.0027 0.002 
Treated 0.0180 0.116 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -0.0088 0.0003 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.0003 0.00004 
Age 0.0272 0.001 
Age square -0.0004 1.08e
-05
 
Male 0.2084 0.012 
Marital status-single -0.0471 0.010 
White 0.0055 0.005 
Black -0.1006 0.010 
Unemployment rate -0.0048 0.001 
Constant -0.0082 0.125 
R-sq. 0.11  
 
 
Sample size for second and third column is 2318914. Treated group consists of HS drop out blind and/or deaf 
individuals and the control group HS dropout non-blind individuals. State dummies, year dummies and the interaction 
terms between treatment group and year dummies and the interaction terms between treatment group and state 













Table 2.9: DDD Estimation of being Employed for Blind and/or Deaf Individuals 
(Treatment Group: HS graduate blind) (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 





Treated*SSI -0.0093 0.007 
SSI benefit  in $100 -0.0002 0.005 
Medicaid in $100 0.0022 0.001 
Treated -0.1480 0.041 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -0.0071 0.0003 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.0005 2.36e
-05
 
Age 0.0333 0.001 
Age square -0.0004 5.94e
-06
 
Male 0.1304 0.003 
Marital status-single -0.0261 0.002 
White 0.0692 0.007 
Black -0.0277 0.008 
Unemployment rate -0.0098 0.001 
Constant 0.0581 0.033 
 R-sq. 0.10  
 
 
Sample size is 7694895. Treated group consists of HS graduate blind and/or deaf individuals and the control group HS 
graduate non-blind individuals. State dummies, year dummies and the interaction terms between treatment group and 
year dummies and the interaction terms between treatment group and state dummies are included in the regression 












Table 2.10: DDD Estimation of being Employed for Blind and/or Deaf Individuals 
(Treatment Group: Some-college blind) (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 





Treated*SSI 0.0038 0.010 
SSI benefit  in $100 -0.0046 0.003 
Medicaid in $100 0.0013 0.0005 
Treated -0.2146 0.058 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -0.0051 0.0002 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.0008 2.79e
-05
 
Age 0.0348 0.001 
Age square -0.0004 9.36e
-06
 
Male 0.0914 0.003 
Marital status-single -0.0162 0.002 
White 0.0645 0.006 
Black 0.0140 0.006 
Unemployment rate -0.0066 0.001 
Constant 0.1254 0.026 
 R-sq. 0.09  
 
 
Sample size is 4768269. Treated group consists of some-college (1 to 3 years) blind and/or deaf individuals and control 
group consists of some-college non-blind individuals. State dummies, year dummies and the interaction terms between 
treatment group and year dummies and the interaction terms between treatment group and state dummies are included 












Table 2.11: DDD Estimation of being Employed for Blind and/or Deaf Individuals 
(Treatment Group: College graduate blind) (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 





Treated*SSI 0.0002 0.006 
SSI benefit  in $100 -0.0002 0.003 
Medicaid in $100 0.0012 0.000 
Treated -0.1408 0.037 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -0.0026 0.0001 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.0008 4.27e
-05
 
Age 0.0317 0.001 
Age square -0.0004 1.07e
-05
 
Male 0.1000 0.002 
Marital status-single -0.0007 0.002 
White 0.0687 0.006 
Black 0.0547 0.005 
Unemployment rate -0.0035 0.001 
Constant 0.1896 0.023 
 R-sq. 0.10  
 
 
Sample size is 5241070. Treated group consists of college-graduate (4 years and more) blind and/or deaf individuals 
and control group consists of college-graduate non-blind individuals. State dummies, year dummies and the interaction 
terms between treatment group and year dummies and the interaction terms between treatment group and state 








































































The health status of children is an important factor in any household. Having a 
child in poor health imposes additional time and financial constraints for parents that can 
impact their labor supply. If a child’s illness is expensive to treat then it increases the 
parental work incentive. On the other hand, children with impaired health attract more 
parental time investment which in turn may reduce parents’ (particularly mothers’) labor 
force participation. A mother’s choices about whether to participate in the labor market 
and how many hours to work might also be affected by the nature of the illness of a child. 
Using cross-section data, previous researchers find that sick children negatively affect 
their mothers’ labor supply. However, past studies have been largely restricted to static 
measures of employment. Children with chronic illnesses that persist for a long time may 
affect the employment of their primary care givers in different ways than short-term 
illnesses do. This study expands the literature by examining the labor market behavior of 
mothers with children at risk for long-term adverse health conditions. By using the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Child Development Supplements (CDS) 
datasets, one can construct a measure of chronic child illness. In this study I examine the 




participation decision based on Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the Child 
Development Supplements (CDS) datasets from 1997 to 2007.  
The topic is important for several reasons. First, a significant number of children 
in the United States have at least one serious health limitation. According to Bethell, et al. 
(2011), almost 43 percent of US children (32 million) under age 18 currently have at least 
one of 20 chronic illnesses. Kraus, et al. (1996), show that 6.7 percent of all children 
under age 18 are disabled due to activity limitations. Second, the Personal Responsibility  
and Work  Opportunity  Reconciliation  Act of 1996, which  promotes  labor market  
activity  through  explicit work  requirements  and  time  limits  on welfare use, has  lent  
new urgency  to understanding  the  role  of family  health  problems.  It is  important to  
identify  obstacles  to maternal  labor market  activity  and  to formulate  policies  to 
remove these obstacles.  Finally,  understanding  how child health  problems  impede  
labor  market  activity  is critical  to  formulating  a sensible  child  disability  policy, 
because  parental  earnings  losses are an important  justification  for providing  cash 
benefits  to families with disabled  children. 
 
3.2. Literature review 
 
Having children with illness usually exerts constraints on mothers’ time for labor 
market activity since caring for these children is likely to be more time-consuming (if 
children need special care  or frequent medical attention). Having young children at home 




the need for and costs of child care services. Most of the prior research examining the 
effect of child health on mothers’ labor supply use a single-year dataset and exploit the 
cross-sectional information on children health outcomes and mothers’ labor market 
behavior.  
  Gould (2004) constructs a theoretical static labor-supply model of mothers to 
explicitly incorporate the financial and time costs associated with the presence of 
unhealthy children. The model predicts that children with time-intensive illnesses and 
those with unpredictable illnesses negatively influence mother’s labor supply, whereas 
children having illnesses with a strong financial component have a positive effect on 
mother’s labor supply. In order to empirically test it she uses 1997 PSID Child 
Development Supplement and organizes a focus group of doctors to categorize illnesses 
and disabilities by the type of resources they require. Her empirical results suggest that 
after controlling for the financial burden of illness, single mothers significantly reduce 
the number of hours they work when they have a child with a time-intensive illness. 
Married mothers are more likely to work, or work more hours, if they have a child with 
time-intensive illness, but are less likely to work if they have child with severe and 
unpredictable illness. From the Tobit model she finds that the estimated marginal effect 
of time-intensive illness on observed log work hours is 0.19. The estimated marginal 
effect of severe and unpredictable illness on observed log work hours is -0.70. This is a 
large effect considering married mothers work 35 hours per week on the average if they 




severe and unpredictable illness on the uncensored observed dependent variable are 0.12 
and -0.54 respectively. 
Corman, Reichman and Noonan (2005) estimate the effects of poor child health 
on the labor supply of mothers using city-level data from the National Fragile Families 
and Child Wellbeing Study of mostly unwed parents. They find that having a child in 
poor health reduces a mother’s probability of working by 8 percentage points and her 
hours of work by three per week if she is employed. The negative effects of poor child 
health on maternal labor supply are strongest for unmarried mothers who are older than 
21 years old and who are high school graduates. They also find  that the father having 
children with another partner increases the mothers’ labor supply, even after controlling 
for the child’s health status and numerous other covariates. 
Powers (2001) examines the impact of child disability on maternal labor supply 
using the October 1992 Current Population Survey (CPS) and Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP) dataset. According to the CPS, a child is disabled if the 
child has a physical, mental, or other health condition that adversely affects his or her 
ability to learn. Powers hypothesizes that reported child disability may be endogenous 
and may lead to biased estimates. There may be some unobserved characteristics relating 
to a mother’s behavior (e.g., the mother is over conscious about the health status of her 
child and therefore over or understates the true health condition of her child) that affect 
both the explanatory variable (the child’s disability status) and the dependent variable 
(the mother’s choice of labor force participation). To prevent bias she uses eleven 




two-stage linear-probability model, Powers finds that child disability reduces married 
mothers’ labor supply by 4.7 percentage points. Similarly, using a two-stage Probit model 
she finds that married mothers’ labor supply falls by 1.7 percentage points if they have a 
disabled child. 
Powers (2003) uses the 1991 to 1992 SIPP dataset and three definitions of child 
disabilities to estimate the effects of poor child health (among children aged 0 to 21) on 
mothers’ labor force participation. Her empirical results are sensitive to the definitions of 
disability. Using a Probit model she finds a negative employment effect of between 3 to 6 
percentage points for a static measure of work activity. However, using a dynamic 
measure of work activity she finds a positive employment effect for some of the disability 
definitions. She finds that child disability reduces married mothers’ work by 3.7 hours 
per week. For single mothers she finds negative effects of between 0.6 to 5 hours per 
week due to child disability. Powers (2003) also provides a detailed summary table of 
data sets and samples for many studies of the effects of poor child health on the labor 
supply of the mothers. Most of the twelve studies she reviews show reduced labor force 
participation among mothers of disabled children; a few show no effects. Powers points 
out that a small sample size is one of the reasons for the inconsistencies in the literature. 
Although the studies vary considerably in the way the authors define child disability, they 
use similar sets of control variables, which include maternal socio-demographic 
characteristics, family structure, and regional economic conditions. Many also include 
policy variables, such as the generosity of state welfare benefits. The studies tend to focus 




Using the Child Development Supplements from the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), a data source that allows the identification of chronic child illness, I 
examine how the presence of chronic child illness affects a married mother’s labor force 
participation over the period 1997 to 2007. From Child Development Supplement (CDS) 
dataset, I have identified the chronic illness of children which are long-term or 
permanent. Children with a chronic condition may be ill or well at any given time, but 
they are always living with their condition. I assume that the chronic child illness is 
exogenous. The time commitment required to care for a child in poor health may inhibit 
the mother’s ability to participate in the labor market, resulting in both lower family 
income and a reduced ability to invest in the child’s health. Thus, children with a chronic 
illness may be at risk for adverse long-term health and economic outcomes both directly 
(because they have the health condition) and indirectly (through family income). 
 
3.3. Data  
 
I use the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) dataset from 1997 to 2007 which are produced and distributed by the 
Institute for Social Research, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Ann 
Arbor, MI.  The Child Development Supplement (CDS) is one research component of the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), a longitudinal study of a representative sample 
of U.S. individuals and the families in which they reside. The CDS datasets are available 




the corresponding individual and family PSID file, so I can take advantage of the 
intergenerational and long-panel dimensions of the PSID data. The CDS-I (1997) 
successfully completed interviews with 2,394 families, providing information on 3,563 
children (0 to 12 years old) if selected, up to two children per family. In subsequent CDS 
surveys, it collected information on the same children if available and did not add any 
new children. In 2002-2003, CDS re-contacted families in CDS-I who remained active in 
the PSID panel. CDS-II successfully re-interviewed 2,021 families who provided data on 
2,907 children and adolescents aged 5 to18 years.  CDS-III (2007) gathered information 
on 1,506 children and adolescents aged 10 to 19 years. The child questionnaire comprises 
of detailed information on the child’s health and medical expenses, including a list of 
medical conditions, limitations in school or play activities, recent doctor’s visits and 
hospitalizations, health insurance, government assistance, and overall health status. 
The PSID CDS provides information on 28 different illnesses or medical 
conditions. These illnesses or medical conditions are reported in the appendix. Out of 
these different illnesses, thirteen illnesses are defined as chronic illnesses. Childhood 
illness is chronic when it is long-term, permanent, or keeps coming back. Children with 
chronic conditions may be well at any given time, but they are always living with their 
condition
5
. The chronic illnesses listed in the CDS files are asthma, epilepsy, diabetes, 
heart problems, elevated levels of lead, anemia, autism (and if child is older than 2 years 
old), speech impairment, serious difficulty seeing or blindness, serious hearing difficulty 
or deafness, mental retardation, developmental delay, and migraines. I define a child as 
                                                          





having chronic illness when he or she has at least one of these thirteen chronic illnesses. 
The illness or medical conditions are based on the responses to the question: “Has your 
doctor or health professionals ever said that (CHILD) had (ILLNESS)?” Therefore, it is 
possible for the parent not to mention an illness, even though a doctor may have stated 
the child had that illness. However, following Gould (2004), I assume that a parent who 
cares for the child will likely mention any illnesses of that child or at least illnesses that 
require sufficient resources or care. Certain combinations of illnesses lead to more severe 
consequences than any single condition. For example when epilepsy is combined with 
mental retardation, developmental delay, speech impairment, deafness, blindness, and 
autism, the compounded illness imposes a much bigger burden on the family in many 
dimensions. 
Since chronic illnesses typically do not go away permanently, I assume that if a child 
has such an illness in 1997 then, even if he or she is not interviewed in other years like 
2002-03 and 2007, the illness is still present. For example, 254 married mothers were 
interviewed in CDS-I but were not interviewed in CDS-II, and therefore there is no health 
information for their children in CDS-II. For these families the child chronic illness 
information from CDS-I is substituted for the missing CDS-II information and the 
corresponding mother’s information is collected from the individual-level PSID file when 
it is available. This way I retain 140 additional mothers who were interviewed in CDS-I 
but not in CDS-II. I have followed similar methodology to retain more mothers in CDS-
III. It is possible that some of the children who did not have a chronic illness in CDS-I, 




illness if it is between CDS-I and CDS-II and therefore I do not include them in the 
analysis for the years in between the first two CDSs. Similarly if the emergence of a 
chronic illness occurs between CDS-II and CDS-III then no information is available 
about timing of the child’s health condition. Therefore I do not include the information of 
these children’s’ mothers for the years in between CDS-II and CDS-III. However, if the 
children develop illness in CDS-II and their chronic illness condition persists in CDS-III 
then I carry forward the new information on these children from CDS-II to CDS-III. 
  I restrict my analysis to mothers of children between 0 to 18 years. I maintain this 
age restriction when I carry forward the information on chronic child illness from CDS-I 
to CDS-III. For example if a child is 9 years old in 1997 (CDS-I), then he or she will not 
be considered in 2007 (CDS-III).  
After acquiring information on the children’s health I obtain mothers’ 
demographic, labor market and geographic location information in the years 1999, 2001, 
and 2005 from the individual-level PSID dataset. For the years 1999 and 2001, I carry 
forward the child health information from CDS-I, and for the year 2005, I carry forward 
the child health information from CDS-II. From the individual and family files of the 
PSID, I obtain health information on the mother, her age, education, race, marital status, 
labor income, husband’s income, total family income, hours of work per week, number of 
weeks worked, number of children, state-fips, mother’s person number and interview 
number. I restrict my sample to married mothers with non-missing information on age, 
race, state, years of education, and number of children. The information on mother’s race 




shows the percentage of children that are available in all the three Child Development 
Supplements who are suffering from the various chronic illnesses. Table 3.1B shows the 
number of married mothers with or without chronically ill children. The following table 
shows the number of married mothers and percentage of married mothers with chronic 
child illness in each sample year after the filtering process. 
Table 3.1C: Married mothers (with < 18 years children) from PSID and CDS 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Married mothers 1260 1176 1173 1152 980 816 
Percentage of Married mothers with 
at least one chronically ill child   
33 33 33 38 37 39 
  
Table 3.2 displays summary statistics for the full sample, pooled across the six 
sample years. I examine two alternative measures of labor supply: employed or not, a 
binary variable and annual hours of work. The binary variables represents whether 
mother worked for money in the last year or not. The annual hours of work variable is 
constructed from wife’s total weeks worked on all main jobs in the last year and hours of 
work per weeks worked on the main jobs in the last year. Almost 72% of the married 
mothers are employed. Almost 35 percent of the married mothers have at least one 
chronically ill child. Total family income is the sum of taxable income of the household 
head and his wife, transfer income of the head and his wife, transfer income of other 
family unit members, taxable income of other family unit members, and social security 
income. Other family income is constructed by subtracting the mother’s income and the 
husband’s income from total family income. Child disability variable is constructed from 




Regional variables control for location specific labor market conditions. Following the 
definition of Census regions, I have constructed four regions: Northeast, Midwest, 
Southern and Western. In order to control for the effects of state-level benefits and local 
labor-market conditions, I include the maximum AFDC/TANF benefit, Medicaid 
expenditures, and the state-level unemployment rate. Rather than including the 
endogenous variables for actual financial assistance received (which are means-tested and 
thus a function of the work decision), I control for potential Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC or TANF) benefits and potential Medicaid benefits. Potential 
AFDC/TANF benefits collected from several issues of Welfare Rules Databooks in the 
website of Urban Institute are calculated as the maximum benefit to the family based on 
state levels and family size of three. Maximum AFDC/TANF benefits may influence a 
woman’s decision to work while her work hour decision will not affect state benefit 
levels. Potential Medicaid benefits are calculated as the average monthly Medicaid 
payments from the official website of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 
The exclusion of an insurance variable in the regressions may lead to omitted variable 
bias as insurance is related to both the health and employment decision. Women who 
work are more likely to be privately insured and less likely to be publicly insured. 
Moreover, unhealthy children increase the incentive for health insurance. However 
including whether family members have public insurance may cause endogeneity bias. 
Blank (1989) proxies for the public health insurance with the average state-specific 




expenditure as an explanatory variable. State level unemployment rates are collected 
from the official website of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
Theoretically I assume that mothers’ utility depends on consumption and leisure. 
A mother can allocate her time in three broad categories: working, leisure and child care. 
Additionally, a mother faces a budget constraint that distributes earnings on consumption 
and her child’s medical expenses. However, assuming that her child’s health affects both 
the child medical expenses and the mother’s working time, the indirect utility of a mother 
will be adversely affected by a chronic child illness. For simplicity, I assume that, apart 
from the child’s health condition, the mother’s labor supply depends on her individual 
characteristics such as age, education, race, and her own health status. Additionally, 
factors such as the number of children under age 18 in the family, husband’s income and 
other family income, and child disability are also likely affect her decision to participate 
in the labor market. Finally, the factors that vary by geographic regions and likely affect 
mothers’ decision to work are state-level unemployment rates, state-level maximum 
monthly AFDC/TANF benefits, and state-level average Medicaid spending. 
     
3.4. Empirical Model   
 
I use a Probit model where the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable of 
labor force participation.  
Consider the following model: 
* / /
0 1it it itY Chronic X S u             






itY is an unobserved latent random variable, ‘i’ denotes an individual, ‘t’ denotes 
time period, and  uit is a random error term. Given the above framework the probability of 
employment can be expressed as follows: 
1itY   if 
* 0itY   
     = 0 otherwise 
Here, itY  is observable when an individual participate in the labor market, X is observable 
time varying and time invariant vector of strictly exogenous characteristics which 
influences *itY  for example mother’s age, square of age, education, race, mother’s health 
condition, presence of disabled child, age of youngest child, number of children under 18 
in the family unit, husband’s labor income, other family income. The vector S includes 
state level unemployment rate, state level AFDC/TANF benefits, state level Medicaid 
expenditure and regional variables. Here, γ is the parameter vector associated with X and 
δ is the vector associated with the S. The main coefficient of interest is the one 
corresponding to the variable ‘chronic’, which denotes existence of chronic child illness. 
I also use a fixed effect linear probability model to estimate the impact of chronic child 
illness on married mother’s employment. In order to examine whether married mother’s 
hours of work is affected due to the existence of chronically ill child I estimate a pooled 






3.5. Regression Results   
 
In order to investigate the impact of child illness on married mother’s labor force 
participation decision I use a Pooled Probit model. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable of employment status (employed or not). Table 3.3 displays the 
estimated results of Pooled Probit Model. The estimated regression result shows that the 
estimated coefficient of the variable indicating whether a mother has at least one 
chronically ill child is -0.08.   This suggests that mother’s likelihood of being employed 
goes down if she has at least one chronically ill child. The corresponding marginal effect 
of the main coefficient suggests that the existence of chronically ill child will reduce 
mother’s probability of employment by 2.5 percentage points. Considering almost 72% 
married mothers are employed this effect is small. Also the 95% confidence interval for 
the bootstrap results suggest that range of the effect is between -0.048 to -0.002.  
Presence of disabled child does not significantly increase the probability of being 
employed. With the increase in the age, married mother significantly increases her 
probability of labor force participation. As the education level increases, married mother 
significantly increases her probability to work. Non-white mothers are less likely to be 
employed compared to white mothers. Mothers with fair/poor health are less likely to be 
employed.  Mother with physical and work limitation is less likely to be employed. State 
level maximum AFDC/TANF benefits and average Medicaid expenditures have their 
expected negative sign. However state level average Medicaid expenditures do not 




unemployment rate has its expected negative sign on the mother’s probability of labor 
force participation decision. Married mother’s probability of being employed 
significantly goes down with the increase in number of children under 18. Husband’s 
labor income and other family income significantly reduce married mother’s labor force 
participation decision.  
I have also used a fixed effect (FE) linear probability model to examine the effect 
of chronic child illness on married mother’s labor force participation decision and the 
estimated results are reported in table 3.4. After controlling for individual FE the 
existence of at least one chronically ill child has relatively much smaller impact on the 
employment probability of a mother. Specifically mother’s probability of being employed 
goes down by almost 0.02 percentage points with the existence of a chronically ill child. 
This is a very small effect and the 95% confidence interval suggests that the range of the 
effect is between -0.034 to 0.030.  
Table 3.5 reports a fixed effect Ordinary Least Square (OLS) model to examine 
whether existence of chronic ill child reduces married mother’s hours of work. The 
estimated regression result for the main coefficient of interest suggests that a married 
mother does not significantly reduce hours of work per year if she has at least one 
chronically ill child. Specifically a mother’s hours of work goes up by almost 37 hours 
per year with the existence of a chronically ill child. Considering average hours of work 
per year are almost 1587, this effect is substantially small. Presence of disabled child 
does not significantly increase mother’s hours of work. With the increase in the age, 




work limitation work less hours per year. Number of children under 18 in the family 
significantly reduces married mother’s hours of work per year.  
Table D10 in the appendix reports the estimated results for Pooled Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) model to examine whether existence of chronic ill child reduces married 
mother’s hours of work. The estimated regression result for the main coefficient of 
interest suggests that a married mother does not significantly reduce hours of work per 
year if she has at least one chronically ill child. Specifically a mother’s hours of work 
goes up by almost 10 hours per year with the existence of a chronically ill child. The 95% 
confidence interval ranges between -36.26 to 56.51. Considering average hours of work 
per year are almost 1587, this effect is substantially small. Presence of disabled child 
does not significantly increase mother’s hours of work. With the increase in the age, 
married mother significantly increases hours of work per year. Mother with physical and 
work limitation work less hours per year. Number of children under 18 in the family 
significantly reduces married mother’s hours of work per year. Husband’s labor income 
significantly reduces married mother’s hours of work per year.  
 
3.6. Conclusions  
 
In this paper, I examine how the presence of a chronic child illness influences the 
labor supply of a married mother. The time commitment involved in caring for a child in 
poor health may inhibit a mother’s ability to participate in the labor market. Previous 




section data. However, most of the studies use only a single year dataset that lacks 
information on changes in both child health and the labor supply of mothers over time. 
Chronically ill children may adversely affect a married mother’s labor force participation 
decision over time differently than the short-term child illness because chronic illnesses 
are long-term or permanent.  
I use the PSID Child Development Supplements (CDS) dataset from 1997 to 2007 
to construct chronic child illness which is long-term or permanent.  From the CDS files I 
define a child as chronically ill if he or she has at least one of thirteen chronic illnesses 
such as asthma, epileptic, diabetes, heart problem, elevated levels of lead, anemia, autism 
(and child is older than 2 years old), speech impairment, serious difficulty seeing or 
blindness, serious hearing difficulty or deafness, mental retardation, developmental delay, 
and migraine.  
Using a pooled Probit model I find that having at least one child with chronic 
illness conditions reduces married mother’s probability of working by almost 2.5 
percentage points. Given the fact that about 72% of the mothers in the dataset are 
employed this effect is somewhat smaller. However, the estimated effect is quite precise 
in terms of the narrow confidence interval and low standard error (0.01 using 
bootstrapped simulation) of the effect. Additionally once I control for individual specific 
fixed effect in a linear probability model the effect of existence of at least one chronically 
ill child on the probability of mother’s employment is substantially lower. The pooled 
OLS model suggests that a married working mother increases her hours of work by 




married mother’s average hours of work per year are almost 1587 years, this effect is 
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Table 3.1A: Chronic Child Illness from the three Child Development Supplements 
 
Year CDS-I (1997) CDS-II (2002-03) CDS-III (2007) 
Illness or Medical condition % of children % of children % of children 
An epileptic fit or convulsion 1.54 1.69 1.74 
Asthma 11.06 15.79 16.79 
Diabetes 0.20 0.45 0.56 
Speech impairment of delay 6.90 6.60 7.46 
Serious hearing difficulty or deafness 2.22 1.69 2.05 
Serious difficulty seeing or blindness 1.77 5.33 5.91 
Mental  retardation 0.45 0.69 1.12 
Anemia or an iron deficiency 6.74 4.40 3.36 
Elevated levels of lead in the blood 1.82 1.03 0.37 
Developmental delay 2.86 6.85 8.77 
Autism 0.36 0.62 1.49 
Heart problems 0.76 0.52 1.00 
Migraine 0.22 0.86 0.75 
Total number of children 3563 2907 1608 
 
Table 3.1B: Child Development Supplements Datasets 
 
Mothers CDS-I (1997) CDS-II (2002-
03) 
CDS-III (2007) 
All (14-64) 2256 1777 1145 
Married mothers after filtering (16-64) 1260 1152 816 
Married mothers with no chronic child illness 844 711 496 
Married mothers with at least one chronic  
child illness 
416 441 320 
Note: A child has chronic illnesses if he/she suffers from any of the thirteen illnesses mentioned in table 1A 
(for autism, child with more than 2 years old is considered to have chronic illness).   
 
 
Table 3.1C: Married mothers (with < 18 years children) from PSID and CDS 
Married Mothers 1997  1999 2001 
(2007) 
2003 2005 2007 
Number of Married mothers after filtering 1260 1176 1173 1152 980 816 
% of married mothers with at least 1 
chronically ill child illness illness 
33 33 33 38 37 39 
Note: A child has chronic illnesses if he/she suffers from any of the thirteen illnesses mentioned in table 1A 





Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (married mothers) 
 
Variable Mean Std.  Dev. 
If employed (1=yes) 0.72 0.45 
Average hours per week 26.03 19.28 
Mother’s age 38.09 7.49 
Mother’s education 13.25 2.37 
Mother’s race (1=nonwhite) 0.42 0.49 
Mother’s health(1=fair/poor) 0.08 0.27 
Mother’s limited by health 0.08 0.27 
Number of weeks worked 31.43 21.78 
Mother’s labor income 17725.67 24729.85 
Husband’s labor income 46785.43 60824.23 
Total family income 76212.68 78061.24 
Number of children under 18 2.00 1.04 
Disabled child present 0.09 0.29 
Child with at least 1 chronic illness 0.35 0.48 
Age of the youngest child 8.87 4.51 
Northeast 0.17 0.37 
Midwest 0.24 0.43 
South 0.36 0.48 
West 0.21 0.41 
Sample Size 6557 
 




State level variable Mean Std.  Dev. 
Maximum AFDC benefit by state and 
family size 
364.11 140.52 
Average Medicaid expenses by state 344.49 99.50 
State unemployment rate 4.71 1.14 







Table 3.3: Pooled Probit Estimates of the effect of selected variables on married 
mother’s likelihood of working (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 
 
Variables Coefficients Robust S. E 
Child health measures   
Chronic illness -0.080 0.055 
Presence of disabled child 0.094 0.097 
   
Mother’s characteristics   
Mother’s age 0.085 0.027 
Mother’s age squared -0.001 0.0004 
Mother’s education 0.044 0.013 
Mother’s race nonwhite -0.390 0.061 
Mother’s health -0.057 0.083 
Mother’s limited by health -0.379 0.081 
   
Regional variables   
Western region -0.093 0.083 
Midwest region 0.042 0.065 
Southern region -0.083 0.059 
Maximum AFDC Benefit -0.0002 0.0002 
Average Medicaid Expenditure -0.0001 0.0003 
State level Unemployment -0.012 0.021 
   
Family Variables   
Number of children under 18 -0.064 0.026 
Husband’s labor income(in $1000) -0.002 0.001 
Other family income(in$1000) -0.001 0.001 
   
Constant -1.356 0.505 
Log-pseudo likelihood -3617.69  
Observations 6557  
 









Table 3.4: Fixed Effect Linear Probability Model of the effect of selected variables 
on married mother’s likelihood of working (Dependent Variable: Employed or not) 
 
Variables Coefficients S. E 
Child health measures   
Chronic illness -0.002 0.016 
Presence of disabled child 0.043 0.025 
   
Mother’s characteristics   
Mother’s age 0.044 0.007 
Mother’s age squared -0.0004 9.45e
-05
 
Mother’s education 0.039 0.010 
Mother’s health 0.005 0.020 
Mother’s limited by health -0.043 0.020 
   
Regional variables   
Western region -0.004 0.020 
Midwest region 0.006 0.015 
Southern region -0.005 0.014 
Maximum AFDC Benefit 0.0005 0.0002 





State level Unemployment -0.006 0.005 
   
Family Variables   
Number of children under 18 -0.001 0.007 
Husband’s labor income(in $1000) -0.0002 0.0001 
Other family income(in$1000) -0.0003 0.0001 
   
Adj. R Square 0.03  
Observations 6557  
 










Table 3.5: Fixed Effect OLS Estimates of the effect of selected variables on married 
mother’s labor supply: (Dependent Variable: hours of work per year) 
 
Variables Coefficients Robust S. E 
Child health measures   
Chronic illness 37.052 23.549 
Presence of disabled child 2.144 36.422 
   
Mother’s characteristics   
Mother’s age 43.255 10.343 
Mother’s age squared -0.420 0.137 
Mother’s education 17.541 14.582 
Mother’s health 8.150 28.599 
Mother’s limited by health -58.019 28.561 
   
Regional variables   
Western region -28.914 28.562 
Midwest region -15.067 21.113 
Southern region 11.694 19.905 
Maximum AFDC Benefit 0.167 0.316 
Average Medicaid Expenditure 0.198 0.101 
State level Unemployment 7.283 7.356 
   
Family Variables   
Number of children under 18 -54.435 9.573 
Husband’s labor income(in $1000) -0.120 0.150 
Other family income(in$1000) 0.096 0.167 
   
Adj. R square 0.02  
Observations 6557  
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by mother’s id. Husband’s labor income and other family income are in real 2007 










Appendix A:  Illustration of Differences-in-Differences (DD) method 
 
Using the DD method, I want to find out the differences in being employed of the blind 
and/or deaf people for the states that changes their benefit levels over time compared to 
the states that do not change their benefits. The following equation can be estimated for 
this purpose: 
ist ist is it ist st istY SSI STATE YEAR X Z             
Suppose for simplicity, there are two states (A and B) and two years (2001 and 2002). 
State A increases the SSI benefits (by $100 per month) while state B does not increase 
the benefits over the time periods (from year 2001 to 2002). The coefficient of the state 
dummy (STATE) measures the state specific differences in employment and the 
coefficient of the year dummy (YEAR) measures the differences in employment over time 
(from 2001 to 2002) . The vector X includes individual specific characteristics and the 
vector Z includes state level characteristics (unemployment rate, state-level average 
Medicaid expenditures). 
Following are possible cases to illustrate the DD effect: 
In year 2001, the expected probability of employment for an individual in the two states: 
2001 ,2001 2001( | , , )iA A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          




Taking the difference between the expected probabilities of the above two (Δ2001) are 
given by: 
2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI                                                                
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
blind and/ or deaf individual between state A and state B in the year 2001. 
 
In year 2002, the expected probability of employment for an individual in the two states: 
2002 ,2002 2002( | , , )iA A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
2002 ,2002 2002( | , , )iB B iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
Taking the difference between the expected probabilities of the above two (Δ2002) are 
given by: 
2002.( )iA iBSSI SSI    
The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
blind and/ or deaf individual between state A and state B in the year 2002.  
The difference between Δ2001 and Δ2002 gives following expression and α shows the DD 
effect:                             




Appendix B:  Illustration of Difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) method 
Using the DDD method, I want to find out the differences in the changes in the 
probability of being employment of the treatment versus control group with changes in 
the SSI generosity of the states over time and across states. The following equation can 
be estimated for this purpose: 
*ist ist ist ist ist is it ist is
ist it ist st ist
Y SSI SSI T T STATE YEAR T STATE
T YEAR X Z
     
   
      
   
 
Once again, suppose for simplicity, there are two states (A and B) and two years 
(2001 and 2002). State A increases the SSI benefits (by $100 per month) while state B 
does not increase the benefits over the time periods (from year 2001 to 2002). The 
variable “T” is the treatment group indicator. In this model, θ captures fixed differences 
across states between the demographic treatment and the comparison groups. Multiple δ’s 
capture differences in the common time-series changes in labor supply for the treatment 
and the control group. Following are possible cases to illustrate the DDD effect: 
In 2001, the expected probability of employment for the treatment group in the two 
states: 
2001 ,2001 2001 2001( | , , )iA A iA iAE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z                    
2001 2001 2001 2001( | , , )iB iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z                
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 




2001 2001( ) ( )iA iB iA iBSSI SSI SSI SSI                                                                   
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
treatment group between state A and state B in the year 2001.  
In 2001, the expected probability of employment for the control group in the two states: 
2001 2001 2001( | , , )iA i A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z            
2001 2001 2001( | , , )iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
Taking the difference between the expected employment probabilities of the above two 
(Δ2001,C) are given by: 
2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI                                                                
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
control group between state A and state B in the year 2001.  
The difference between the changes in the expected probability of being employment 
between the treatment and control group in year 2001 is given by the following 
expression (DD1): 
2001.( )iA iBSSI SSI    





2002 2002 2002 2002( | , , )iA iA iA iAE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z                
2002 2002 2002 2002( | , , )iB iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI SSI X Z            
Taking the difference between the expected probabilities of the above two (Δ2002,T) are 
given by: 
2002 2002( ) ( )iA iB iA iBSSI SSI SSI SSI                                                                   
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 
treatment group between state A and state B in the year 2002.  
In 2002, the expected probability of being employment for the control group in the two 
states: 
2002 2002 2002( | , , )iA i A iAE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z          
2002 2002 2002( | , , )iB iB iBE Y SSI X Z SSI X Z        
Taking the difference between the expected probabilities of the above two (Δ2002,C) are 
given by: 
2002.( )iA iBSSI SSI                                                                
 The above expression shows the differences in probability of being employed for the 




The difference between the changes in the expected probability of being employment 
between the treatment and control group in year 2002 is given by the following 
expression (DD2): 
2002.( )iA iBSSI SSI    
The difference between DD1 and DD2 gives following DDD effect: 
2001 2002 2001 2002.[( ) ( )]iA iA iB iBSSI SSI SSI SSI     
The DDD estimator β then measures the difference in the change in labor supply of 
treated group versus control group due to the changes in SSI benefits. For the DDD 













Appendix C: SSI Payment, Participation and Employment 
Table C1: State-wise SSI Benefits (real 2000 dollars), SSI Participation and Employment Rates 
States  & D.C SSI 2000 
 
SSI Participat. 2000 Employ. 2000 SSI 2001 
 
SSI Participat. 2001 Employ. 2001 
Alabama 572 13.89 43.64 572.82 13.4 43.78 
Alaska 874 7.94 55.62 866.02 6.11 59.11 
Arizona 582 9.97 51.4 582.52 14.82 46.39 
Arkansas 512 13.88 46.3 514.56 13.78 41.09 
California 749 13.89 47.49 748.54 14.66 49.34 
Colorado 549 9.77 58.21 550.49 9.67 55.53 
Connecticut 733 11.18 56.48 719.9 10.23 53.27 
Delaware 652 12.89 52.55 650.49 14.44 54.45 
D.C 819 14.76 42.75 812.62 14.42 44.2 
Florida 590.4 10.06 49.03 590.68 12.28 49.01 
Georgia 512 12.53 48.57 514.56 10.39 43.59 
Hawaii 516.9 8.74 54.38 519.32 10.84 42.2 
Idaho 564 9.23 56.34 565.05 4.43 55.65 
Illinois 512 11.83 50.68 514.56 13.32 51.46 
Indiana 534 9.36 55.11 535.92 8.19 52.79 
Iowa 813 9.71 61.75 815.53 7.37 57.91 
Kansas 512 9.88 58.02 514.56 13.46 60.86 
Kentucky 684 19.29 38.51 681.55 17.57 36.04 
Louisiana 520 14.13 41.26 522.33 12.97 45.78 
Maine 522 13.71 51.92 524.27 10.64 45.74 
Maryland 578 9.26 56.54 578.64 11.24 46.96 
Massachusetts 661.74 15.57 52.93 659.94 17.08 56.03 
Michigan 683.5 12.95 50.36 681.07 11.4 51.38 
Minnesota 593 9.83 62.24 593.2 11.48 59.72 
Mississippi 512 14.84 41.64 514.56 18.16 35.94 
Missouri 668 10.11 52.37 666.02 13.37 44.62 
Montana 606 9.43 56.8 605.83 7.55 55.71 
Nebraska 516 9.7 66.52 520.39 10.74 57.45 
Nevada 621.3 6.65 54.04 620.68 4.33 54.38 
New Hampshire 539 9.64 62.6 540.78 9.82 68.78 
New Jersey 794.36 10.94 50.3 797.44 10.52 50.66 
New Mexico 612 12.65 47.03 611.65 9.08 51.43 
New York 599 15.65 45.06 599.03 18.38 43.23 
North Carolina 609 9.92 51.39 608.74 13.16 46.64 
North Dakota 512 7.58 65.34 514.56 9.19 64.44 
Ohio 512 12.78 52.89 514.56 11.33 53.28 
Oklahoma 568 10.87 51.03 567.48 9.72 48.08 
Oregon 538.7 9.4 56.61 540.49 11.15 48.26 
Pennsylvania 566.8 13.08 50.92 541.17 13.99 50.92 
Rhode Island 576.35 17.5 47.8 577.04 19.83 51.45 
South Carolina 860 11.88 45.27 852.43 13.01 44.08 
South Dakota 527 11.25 63.24 529.13 11.39 63.55 
Tennessee 512 14.25 45.23 514.56 14.04 45.71 
Texas 527 10.2 50.1 529.13 9.88 49.61 
Utah 515.13 8.38 62.84 517.6 2.75 65.73 
Vermont 569.66 12.66 57.73 571.88 13.49 61.38 
Virginia 853 9.31 53.28 845.63 9.45 53.43 
Washington 649.25 9.75 55 646.75 10.79 52.98 
West Virginia 512 16.92 34.58 514.56 19.78 32.21 
Wisconsin 595.78 10 60.37 595.9 9.22 51.84 




Table C2: State-wise SSI Benefits (real 2000 dollars), SSI Participation and Employment Rates 
















Alabama 581.73 15.91 44.53 571.96 16.26 37.32 
Alaska 872.12 3.89 59.24 854.21 8.68 62.4 
Arizona 591.35 17.4 43.19 581.31 7.65 50.01 
Arkansas 524.04 14.14 45.97 515.89 12.19 47.83 
California 780.77 15.36 46.09 765.42 14.6 45.06 
Colorado 559.62 9.01 57.15 550.47 11.92 49.02 
Connecticut 718.27 13.09 59.61 695.79 8.31 60.7 
Delaware 658.65 15.2 55.5 646.73 13.72 53.77 
D.C 819.23 12.5 42.9 802.8 18.24 41.37 
Florida 599.42 12.06 46.42 589.16 12.95 47.7 
Georgia 524.04 11.32 41.57 515.89 14.16 45.04 
Hawaii 528.75 4.52 47.79 515.89 13.96 52.26 
Idaho 574.04 10.53 59.51 564.49 12.01 57.18 
Illinois 524.04 15.41 51.77 515.89 12.82 52.69 
Indiana 545.19 8.61 51.29 536.45 9.82 52.8 
Iowa 828.85 11.67 57.07 817.76 10.08 60.84 
Kansas 524.04 9.6 55.34 515.89 12.11 54.82 
Kentucky 689.42 17.39 36.46 676.64 19.85 31.8 
Louisiana 531.73 10.27 47.25 523.36 20.49 44.36 
Maine 533.65 11.07 43.78 525.23 14.28 50.02 
Maryland 587.5 9.07 52.79 577.57 10.7 51.18 
Massachusetts 668.02 15.8 54.03 655.83 19.79 48.48 
Michigan 688.94 13.12 48.16 676.17 13.3 46.71 
Minnesota 601.92 9.39 64.32 591.59 6.54 66.21 
Mississippi 524.04 14.48 40.86 515.89 15.68 40.47 
Missouri 674.04 15.84 50.67 661.68 12.72 49.69 
Montana 614.42 9.15 63.43 603.74 9.06 61.26 
Nebraska 531.73 7.97 62.15 525.23 13.99 56.4 
Nevada 629.13 8.5 51.37 618.04 14.5 51.96 
New Hampshire 550 11.06 64.22 541.12 6.13 61.69 
New Jersey 809.96 7.86 55.51 798.47 8.97 46.43 
New Mexico 620.19 6.97 51.14 609.35 16.55 47.59 
New York 607.69 14.34 51.1 597.2 16.18 43.71 
North Carolina 617.31 10.56 47.32 606.54 11.51 43.37 
North Dakota 524.04 9.95 59.64 515.89 7.78 62.69 
Ohio 524.04 14.93 48.81 515.89 12.82 45.46 
Oklahoma 579.33 11.8 54.77 566.12 9.61 48.32 
Oregon 549.71 9.21 48.15 540.84 10.36 55.99 
Pennsylvania 550.38 12.75 49.32 541.5 15.88 44.49 
Rhode Island 585.91 19.42 49.71 569.49 12.01 43.14 
South Carolina 858.65 10.08 44.13 841.12 10.76 46.07 
South Dakota 538.46 6.67 69.49 529.91 7.35 69.54 
Tennessee 524.04 14.33 40.9 515.89 11.53 45.53 
Texas 538.46 9.5 47.37 529.91 10.89 47.44 
Utah 527.05 2.43 58.59 518.81 9.47 56.69 
Vermont 580.81 11.91 57.12 564.52 10.3 56.11 
Virginia 851.92 9.69 49 834.58 10.69 50.68 
Washington 654.95 8.75 50.62 643.13 10.48 50.71 
West Virginia 524.04 19.41 31.23 515.89 15.94 32.77 
Wisconsin 604.6 7.59 59.44 594.19 16.68 51.98 




Table C3: State-wise SSI Benefits (real 2000 dollars), SSI Participation and Employment Rates 
















Alabama 567.27 13.18 42.49 565.49 15.28 40.33 
Alaska 841.82 4.91 54.42 832.74 9.12 54.51 
Arizona 576.36 10.69 47.06 574.34 9.19 47.63 
Arkansas 512.73 12.78 43.77 512.39 13.64 41.26 
California 776.36 12.72 46.88 769.03 16.02 46.47 
Colorado 546.36 6.6 62.07 534.51 9.75 58.59 
Connecticut 679.09 7.74 50.24 661.06 13.51 53.63 
Delaware 640 13.81 50.91 636.28 10.03 56.96 
D.C 791.82 14.84 50.39 784.07 14.01 38.72 
Florida 584 12.54 45.24 581.77 11.41 46.59 
Georgia 512.73 10.58 44.27 512.39 11.08 46.68 
Hawaii 512.73 11.36 48.86 512.39 7.85 55.45 
Idaho 560 9.23 48.4 558.41 10.97 51.96 
Illinois 512.73 9.86 50.35 512.39 11.85 49.19 
Indiana 532.73 12.18 55.69 531.86 9.92 50.54 
Iowa 811.82 8.83 52.97 810.62 9.85 57.01 
Kansas 512.73 9.55 48.8 512.39 8.69 58.37 
Kentucky 669.09 17.99 37.21 664.6 17.19 36.73 
Louisiana 520 14.61 41.69 519.47 16.62 40.47 
Maine 521.82 8.56 47.86 521.24 16.14 49.72 
Maryland 572.73 12.52 43.79 570.8 11.95 52.68 
Massachusetts 648.85 15.44 45.19 644.9 18.71 49.19 
Michigan 668.64 14.75 43.97 664.16 14.57 47.23 
Minnesota 586.36 11.28 60.79 566.37 10.02 56.47 
Mississippi 512.73 13.57 35.03 512.39 18.81 40.27 
Missouri 654.55 12.02 50.65 650.44 13.28 47.82 
Montana 598.18 9.22 55.78 595.58 11.79 60.97 
Nebraska 523.64 9.14 53.59 520.35 8.36 60.03 
Nevada 612.09 7.83 45.67 609.12 9.57 55.03 
New Hampshire 537.27 11.79 56.97 536.28 21.42 43.94 
New Jersey 792.15 14.11 47.41 791.47 13.83 50.06 
New Mexico 603.64 18.84 45.27 600.88 11.17 48.67 
New York 591.82 16.17 46.08 589.38 16.64 45.5 
North Carolina 600.91 12.99 42.22 598.23 10.28 45.71 
North Dakota 512.73 10.14 60.13 512.39 14.78 60.74 
Ohio 512.73 11.95 49.54 512.39 14 46.7 
Oklahoma 558.18 9.35 45.24 554.87 10.58 46.73 
Oregon 537 7.66 60.37 536.02 13.53 49.92 
Pennsylvania 537.64 13.93 48.42 536.64 14.3 47.04 
Rhode Island 564.86 14.9 53.83 563.14 22.59 49.09 
South Carolina 829.09 11.3 40.93 820.35 12.88 38.49 
South Dakota 526.36 13.39 58.78 525.66 17.67 56.82 
Tennessee 512.73 12.46 44.02 512.39 15.92 41.28 
Texas 526.36 10.54 47.61 525.66 11.42 49 
Utah 515.57 5.96 61.42 515.16 8.53 59.65 
Vermont 560.04 12.21 64.76 558.44 19.58 55.88 
Virginia 822.73 11.94 44.44 835.4 11.64 53.43 
Washington 636.5 10.82 48.9 632.88 11.35 50.89 
West Virginia 512.73 23.34 26.68 512.39 18.05 32.57 
Wisconsin 588.89 15.33 57.21 586.53 9.18 58.38 




Table C4: State-wise SSI Benefits (real 2000 dollars), SSI Participation and Employment Rates 

















Alabama 566.67 14.26 39.21 569.17 14.79 40.24 
Alaska 824.79 7.58 62.59 820.83 6.54 56.6 
Arizona 575.21 12.2 46.21 577.5 13.67 41.52 
Arkansas 515.38 12.02 43.01 519.17 12.11 41.56 
California 749.57 15.63 47.99 767.5 16.99 45.18 
Colorado 536.75 9.62 58.34 540 11.85 53.22 
Connecticut 658.97 11.24 56.53 659.17 17.2 51.42 
Delaware 635.04 5.5 47.87 635.83 14.14 40.23 
D.C 811.97 13.6 45.53 923.33 19.73 34.08 
Florida 582.39 12.03 49.68 584.5 11.89 46.34 
Georgia 515.38 13.52 45.16 535.83 12.23 40.87 
Hawaii 515.38 18.55 39.41 519.17 16.89 50.78 
Idaho 542.74 9.24 52.8 545.83 11.27 54.66 
Illinois 515.38 13.19 51.36 519.17 13.28 47.77 
Indiana 534.19 12.18 52.04 537.5 12.07 50.51 
Iowa 814.53 13.67 57.98 820 12.35 59.74 
Kansas 515.38 9.55 57.1 519.17 7.26 58.63 
Kentucky 662.39 19.14 38.86 662.5 19.81 39.49 
Louisiana 522.22 18.48 42.39 525.83 17.03 39.33 
Maine 523.93 12.9 53.36 527.5 13.81 52.33 
Maryland 571.79 12 53.35 574.17 14.22 54.01 
Massachusetts 643.37 17.27 51.5 643.95 20.04 49.33 
Michigan 661.97 15.27 43.26 662.08 16.58 41.32 
Minnesota 584.62 12.78 58.46 586.67 11.01 57.52 
Mississippi 515.38 16.18 37.02 519.17 14 39.13 
Missouri 648.72 13.59 42.89 649.17 11.9 47.35 
Montana 595.73 10.91 56 597.5 5.29 52.21 
Nebraska 515.38 8.92 63.61 526.67 11.14 63.09 
Nevada 608.8 10.24 51.81 610.25 16 50.78 
New Hampshire 538.46 6.84 64.84 541.67 11.72 55.39 
New Jersey 794.32 12.39 47.9 799.47 13.87 48.89 
New Mexico 600.85 12.8 50.13 602.5 14.92 45.77 
New York 589.74 18.47 45.85 591.67 18.36 46.3 
North Carolina 598.29 13.21 44.18 600 11.2 45.43 
North Dakota 515.38 15.42 66.85 519.17 5.13 65.16 
Ohio 515.38 13.74 48.12 519.17 14.2 46.66 
Oklahoma 556.41 11.15 48.03 558.33 13.66 49.3 
Oregon 538.21 10.32 55.11 541.42 12.41 50.94 
Pennsylvania 538.8 15.68 48.38 542 15.42 48.1 
Rhode Island 564.4 17.18 53.42 566.96 24.27 50.94 
South Carolina 812.82 12.3 42.94 809.17 10.84 37.73 
South Dakota 528.21 16.87 57.36 531.67 9.59 56.29 
Tennessee 515.38 16.85 38.96 519.17 12.61 41.83 
Texas 541.03 12.26 48.47 569.17 11.3 47.2 
Utah 518.06 7.63 64.49 521.78 11.22 56.82 
Vermont 559.86 12.66 49.84 562.53 13.11 59.2 
Virginia 899.15 13.09 44.55 935.83 13.63 47.76 
Washington 554.7 12.46 54.46 557.5 13.44 53.56 
West Virginia 515.38 17.58 31.01 519.17 27.68 28.7 
Wisconsin 586.99 12.82 55.08 588.98 12.07 51.93 




Table C5: State-wise SSI Benefits (real 2000 dollars), SSI Participation and Employment Rates 

















Alabama 557.6 12.87 46.53 587.2 13.46 40.35 
Alaska 799.2 10.79 52.37 828.8 4.67 56.98 
Arizona 565.6 8.27 56.03 595.2 11.03 44.79 
Arkansas 509.6 11.41 47.53 539.2 12.71 47.85 
California 748 14.5 49.64 777.6 15.49 46.18 
Colorado 529.6 7.24 62.7 559.2 9.97 58.62 
Connecticut 644 14.32 55.87 673.6 7.79 57.76 
Delaware 621.6 9.42 59.58 651.2 2.64 53.03 
D.C 897.6 22.42 42.1 927.2 19.52 44.7 
Florida 572.32 11.61 49.64 601.92 11.7 44.52 
Georgia 525.6 11.37 53.34 555.2 13.1 46.21 
Hawaii 525.6 13.25 59.76 555.2 14.06 53.69 
Idaho 535.2 7.9 58.45 581.6 5.56 57.39 
Illinois 509.6 11.08 54.08 539.2 13.3 47.45 
Indiana 527.2 10.83 51.92 556.8 11.26 48.39 
Iowa 804.8 9.64 66.9 849.6 10.26 63.93 
Kansas 509.6 8.06 62.37 564.8 8.88 57.77 
Kentucky 647.2 17.13 39.73 676.8 18.56 39.07 
Louisiana 516 14.59 47.73 545.6 12.87 45.91 
Maine 517.6 13.36 54.25 547.2 13.49 45.74 
Maryland 562.4 11.22 54.61 592 11.09 55.01 
Massachusetts 629.39 15.31 55.64 658.99 18.88 47.86 
Michigan 646.8 11.96 45.86 676.4 13.96 40.83 
Minnesota 574.4 5.95 65.52 604 11.47 58.13 
Mississippi 509.6 14.92 46.37 539.2 17.42 39.12 
Missouri 634.4 11.44 54.94 664 13.7 47.98 
Montana 584.8 5.26 59.4 614.4 7.36 59.11 
Nebraska 515.2 8.87 62.49 543.2 10.84 60.9 
Nevada 597.04 11.1 55.5 626.64 6.28 55.65 
New Hampshire 558.4 8.5 57.94 571.2 8.47 57.85 
New Jersey 785.09 12.46 52.85 814.69 11.41 50.5 
New Mexico 589.6 13.97 49.54 619.2 16.32 43.12 
New York 579.2 13.91 49.94 608.8 15.67 46.63 
North Carolina 587.2 11.31 51.83 616.8 12 46.5 
North Dakota 509.6 7.99 74.48 539.2 6.35 66.85 
Ohio 509.6 12.88 49.54 539.2 13.71 45.48 
Oklahoma 546.4 11.5 53.9 576 12.8 51.3 
Oregon 530.96 9.58 51.34 560.56 8.1 47.96 
Pennsylvania 531.52 12.31 53.88 561.12 14.33 48.64 
Rhode Island 555.48 19.52 54.38 571.14 12.48 54.65 
South Carolina 852 10.62 45.54 925.6 11.79 41.31 
South Dakota 521.6 6.79 75.82 551.2 11.96 65.62 
Tennessee 509.6 14.33 44.49 539.2 15.11 39.31 
Texas 557.6 10.81 54.16 587.2 11.59 50.98 
Utah 512.1 10.76 61.11 541.7 5.75 51.5 
Vermont 551.23 13.26 58.66 580.83 8.69 61.64 
Virginia 921.6 12.04 51.44 954.4 11.4 54.19 
Washington 546.4 12.72 53.45 576 11.44 53.3 
West Virginia 509.6 18 38.17 539.2 18.25 38.1 
Wisconsin 576.62 11.24 61.53 606.22 10.49 57.16 




Appendix D: Additional Results 
 
Table D1: DDD Main coefficients of different groups of HS dropout blind and/or deaf (treatment 
group HS dropout blind and control group HS dropout non-blind) 
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E Employment Rate of 
treatment group 
Male -0.0450 0.030 36.01 
Female -0.0273 0.020 21.47 
White -0.0387 0.019 30.82 
Black 0.0210 0.020 20.01 
Single -0.0346 0.019 25.07 
Married -0.0326 0.027 35.31 
Married-White -0.0299 0.023 35.43 
Married-Black 0.0405 0.051 26.97 
Single-White -0.0378 0.019 26.75 
Single-Black 0.0172 0.023 17.81 
Black-Male 0.0330 0.025 22.44 
Black-Female 0.0156 0.024 17.73 
White-Male -0.0436 0.030 37.32 
White-Female -0.0329 0.020 21.74 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the interaction term of treatment and maximum SSI benefits where separate 
regressions are run for each of the demographic group like table 2.8. Standard errors are clustered by state. Dependent 















Table D2: DDD Main coefficients of different groups of HS graduate blind and/or deaf (treatment 
group HS graduate blind and control group HS graduate non-blind) 
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E Employment Rate of 
treatment group 
Male -0.0173 0.009 53.45 
Female -0.0032 0.009 39.91 
White -0.0081 0.009 50.21 
Black -0.0162 0.018 35.45 
Single -0.0143 0.010 42.58 
Married -0.0074 0.010 53.03 
Married-White -0.0060 0.011 54.12 
Married-Black -0.0101 0.036 44.03 
Single-White -0.0149 0.012 45.66 
Single-Black -0.0243 0.022 31.82 
Black-Male 0.0107 0.022 37.72 
Black-Female -0.0395 0.023 33.14 
White-Male -0.0175 0.012 56.06 
White-Female 0.0002 0.009 41.52 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the interaction term of treatment and maximum SSI benefits where separate 
regressions are run for each of the demographic group like table 2.9. Standard errors are clustered by state. Dependent 















Table D3: DDD Main coefficients of different groups of some-college blind and/or deaf (treatment 
group Some-college blind and control group Some-college non-blind) 
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E Employment Rate of 
treatment group 
Male -0.0014 0.011 61.36 
Female 0.0107 0.014 51.73 
White 0.0058 0.011 59.22 
Black 0.0037 0.027 46.78 
Single 0.0067 0.010 52.42 
Married 0.0024 0.014 61.43 
Married-White 0.0126 0.017 62.89 
Married-Black -0.0161 0.036 51.05 
Single-White -0.0038 0.019 54.44 
Single-Black 0.0123 0.051 44.54 
Black-Male -0.0188 0.038 46.68 
Black-Female 0.0166 0.046 46.86 
White-Male 0.0016 0.012 63.67 
White-Female 0.0104 0.018 52.86 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the interaction term of treatment and maximum SSI benefits where separate 
regressions are run for each of the demographic group like table 2.10. Standard errors are clustered by state. Dependent 














Table D4: DDD Main coefficients of different groups of college-graduate blind and/or deaf 
(treatment group college-graduate blind and control group college-graduate non-blind) 
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E Employment Rate of 
treatment group 
Male -0.0040 0.008 71.21 
Female 0.0033 0.013 63.36 
White -0.0059 0.008 69.11 
Black 0.0591 0.027 60.95 
Single 0.0364 0.009 63.38 
Married -0.0228 0.007 70.85 
Married-White -0.0278 0.009 71.64 
Married-Black 0.0865 0.046 66.7 
Single-White 0.0287 0.012 64.77 
Single-Black 0.0188 0.051 56.62 
Black-Male 0.0749 0.054 61.87 
Black-Female 0.0440 0.040 60.19 
White-Male -0.0113 0.009 72.29 
White-Female -0.0013 0.014 64.38 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the interaction term of treatment and maximum SSI benefits where separate 
regressions are run for each of the demographic group like table 2.11. Standard errors are clustered by state. Dependent 
















Table D5: DD Estimation of all Blind and/or Deaf individuals (dependent variable:  employed or not 
in the last year) 
 
Linear Probability Model 
Variables Coefficients Robust S.E 
Max SSI benefit  in $100 -0.0015 0.008 
Medicaid in $100 0.0003 0.001 
















Male 0.0002 0.001 
High School 0.0019 0.002 
Some College 0.0011 0.003 
College or more 0.0012 0.002 
Marital status-single 0.0013 0.001 
White -0.0014 0.002 
Black -0.0002 0.003 
Unemployment rate -0.0030 0.001 
Constant 0.5445 0.047 
R-sq. 0.03  
 
Sample size is: 561372. State dummies, year dummies are included in the regression but coefficients for those dummies 
are not reported in this table. Omitted category for education is HS dropout and the omitted category for race dummy is 
the other race. Here SSI benefit is the state level monthly maximum SSI generosity. Medicaid benefit is the state level 
monthly Medicaid expenditure. Here marital status ‘single’ includes widowed, divorced, never married  and separated 
and omitted category is ‘married’ and it consists of married and spouse present, married and spouse absent. Standard 













Table D6: DD Estimation of all Blind and/or Deaf individuals (dependent variable:  annual hours of 
work last year) 
 
Ordinary Least Square Model 
Variables Coefficients Robust S.E 
Max SSI benefit  in $100 -4.190 7.949 
Medicaid in $100 1.023 1.416 
Non-labor Income (in $1000) -3.025 0.224 
Rest of the family income (in $1000) -0.746 0.052 
Age 45.403 0.865 
Age square -0.494 0.009 
Male 188.709 5.568 
High School 60.412 4.001 
Some College 98.260 5.751 
College or more 183.371 6.048 
Marital status-single -95.688 3.557 
White 34.813 4.526 
Black -26.188 5.375 
Unemployment rate -10.118 1.766 
Constant 770.019 42.354 
R-sq. 0.07  
 
Sample size is: 561372. Annual hours of work is calculated by multiplying the usual hours of work per week with 
number of weeks work in the last year. For the years 2008 and 2009 the number of weeks worked in the last years are 
only available for categorical variables and therefore mean value of the variable ‘weekswork1’ times usual hours of 
work per weeks (‘weekswork1’ is corresponding to which the values are given up to 2007) are taken for these years 
according to usual hours of work and the categorical variable of weeks work. Then the average values are replaced for 
these two years. The State dummies, year dummies are included in the regression but coefficients for those dummies 
are not reported in this table. Omitted category for education is HS dropout and the omitted category for race dummy is 
the other race. Here SSI benefit is the state level monthly maximum SSI generosity. Medicaid benefit is the state level 
monthly Medicaid expenditure. Here marital status ‘single’ includes widowed, divorced, never married  and separated 
and omitted category is ‘married’ and it consists of married and spouse present, married and spouse absent. Standard 










Table D7: DDD Main coefficients of different treatment and control groups (Dependent variable: 
annual hours of work) 
 
Groups (Treatment VS Control) 
Coefficient of 
(Max SSI Benefit in 
$100)*(Treatment) 
Robust S.E 
HS Dropout blind VS HS Dropout Non-blind -28.650 17.927 
HS Graduate blind VS HS Graduate Non-blind -19.416 7.240 
Some-college blind VS Some-college Non-blind -3.103 9.315 
College-graduate blind VS College-graduate Non-blind 10.172 14.948 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the interaction term of treatment and maximum SSI benefits where separate DDD 
regressions are run for each of the group. Standard errors are clustered by state. Annual hours of work on the average 
are 1685.19 for HS dropout blind, 1757.06 for HS graduate blind, 1795.47 for some-college blind and 1884.13 for 

























SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E 
Male -6.294 10.045 
Female -2.552 9.987 
White -8.018 8.213 
Black 2.018 12.150 
Single 6.401 12.284 
Married -13.190 7.768 
Married-White 0.254 12.205 
Married-Black -13.668 9.222 
Single-White 17.057 17.080 
Single-Black -32.581 17.290 
Black-Male 11.625 18.009 
Black-Female -5.056 22.016 
White-Male -10.205 10.896 
White-Female -6.878 10.784 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on the maximum SSI benefits where separate regressions are estimated for each of the 















Table D9: DD Main coefficients for different demographic groups with the dependent variable 
worked or not last year   
                                                      
Different Categories 
Coefficient of 
SSI Benefit in $100 
Robust S.E 
Male 0.0021 0.009 
Female -0.0067 0.008 
White -0.0010 0.008 
Black -0.0192 0.011 
Single 0.0015 0.002 
Married 0.0054 0.008 
Married-White 0.0045 0.010 
Married-Black 0.0048 0.017 
Single-White -0.0083 0.008 
Single-Black -0.0311 0.013 
Black-Male -0.0192 0.018 
Black-Female -0.0193 0.014 
White-Male 0.0054 0.010 
White-Female -0.0107 0.007 
 
Note: These are the coefficients on maximum SSI benefits where separate regressions are estimated for each of the 















Table D10: Pooled OLS Estimates of the effect of selected variables on married mother’s labor 
supply: (Dependent Variable: hours of work per year) 
 
Variables Coefficients Robust S. E 
Child health measures   
Chronic illness 10.124 23.646 
Presence of disabled child 24.561 42.243 
   
Mother’s characteristics   
Mother’s age 48.263 11.301 
Mother’s age squared -0.5841 0.1559 
Mother’s education 9.682 5.575 
Mother’s race 97.585 23.888 
Mother’s health -18.173 33.341 
Mother’s limited by health -119.746 39.155 
   
Regional variables   
Western region 32.126 32.106 
Midwest region 23.911 27.069 
Southern region 43.461 25.761 
Maximum AFDC Benefit -0.3080 0.0842 
Average Medicaid Expenditure 0.2013 0.1140 
State level Unemployment -0.118 9.021 
   
Family Variables   
Number of children under 18 -78.510 10.980 
Husband’s labor income(in $1000) -0.6475 0.2216 
Other family income(in$1000) 0.1703 0.2536 
   
Constant 671.403 213.590 
Observations 6557  
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered by mother’s id. Husband’s labor income and other family income are in real 2007 








Appendix E: Description on assumption and data construction from PSID and CDS 
 
From the individual and family files of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), I obtain person number, interview number, 1968 ID, age, sex, family unit, 
number of live-birth, year first child born, year youngest child born, education, race, 
marital status, relation to head, number of persons in the family unit, number of children 
under 18 years old in the family unit, age of the youngest child, wife’s employment 
status, wage rate, head of the household’s employment status, whether wife receives 
welfare benefits, labor income of wife, labor income of head, total family income, wife’s 
hours of work per week, number of weeks worked by wife, health status of wife, state-
fips, and poverty. Using person number, interview number and 1968 ID, I construct an ID 
variable to identify mothers. I restrict my sample to married mothers with non-missing 
information on age, race, state, years of education, and number of children. Table below 
shows the information of married mothers from the PSID files before the restriction: 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) individual files: 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Total individuals 19761 20515 21400 22290 22918 23501 
Female 10283 10657 11144 11596 11946 12249 
Mother(all age) 5231 5437 5682 5907 6101 6209 
Mother(14-64) 4554 4731 4976 5185 5358 5457 
Married 
mother(14-64) 






I merge the PSID individual file with the Child Development Supplement (CDS) 
dataset to obtain the information on child health status. I use person number and 1968 
interview number to construct an ID variable for a child. The Child Development 
Supplement (CDS) is one research component of the PSID, a longitudinal study of a 
representative sample of U.S. individuals and the families in which they reside. The CDS 
datasets are available for three periods: 1997, 2002-03 and 2007. The CDS-I (1997) 
successfully completed interviews with 2,394 families, providing information on 3,563 
children (0 to 12 years old) if selected, up to two children per family. In subsequent CDS 
surveys, it collected information on the same children if available and did not add any 
new children. In 2002-2003, CDS re-contacted families in CDS-I who remained active in 
the PSID panel. CDS-II successfully re-interviewed 2,021 families who provided data on 
2,907 children and adolescents aged 5 to18 years.  CDS-III (2007) gathered information 
on 1,506 children and adolescents aged 10 to 19 years. The child questionnaire comprises 
of detailed information on the child’s health and medical expenses, including a list of 
medical conditions, limitations in school or play activities, recent doctor’s visits and 
hospitalizations, health insurance, government assistance, and overall health status. 
The PSID CDS provides information on 28 different illnesses or medical 
conditions (reported at the end of this appendix). Out of these different illnesses, thirteen 
illnesses are defined as chronic illnesses. Childhood illness is chronic when it is long-
term, permanent, or keeps coming back. The chronic illnesses listed in the CDS files are 
asthma, epilepsy, diabetes, heart problems, elevated levels of lead, anemia, autism (and if 




serious hearing difficulty or deafness, mental retardation, developmental delay, and 
migraines. The illness or medical conditions are based on the responses to the question: 
“Has your doctor or health professionals ever said that (CHILD) had (ILLNESS)?” 
Therefore, it is possible for the parent not to mention an illness, even though a doctor 
may have stated the child had that illness. However, following Gould (2004), I assume 
that a parent who cares for the child will likely mention any illnesses of that child or at 
least illnesses that require sufficient resources or care. Certain combinations of illnesses 
lead to more severe consequences than any single condition. For example when epilepsy 
is combined with mental retardation, developmental delay, speech impairment, deafness, 
blindness, and autism, the compounded illness imposes a much bigger burden on the 
family in many dimensions. 
Since chronic illnesses typically do not go away permanently, I assume that if a child 
has such an illness in 1997 then, even if he or she is not interviewed in other years like 
2002-03 and 2007, the illness is still present. For example, 254 married mothers were 
interviewed in CDS-I but were not interviewed in CDS-II, and therefore there is no health 
information for their children in CDS-II. For these families the child chronic illness 
information from CDS-I is substituted for the missing CDS-II information and the 
corresponding mother’s information is collected from the individual-level PSID file when 
it is available. This way I retain 140 additional mothers who were interviewed in CDS-I 
but not in CDS-II. I have followed similar methodology to retain more mothers in CDS-
III. It is possible that some of the children who did not have a chronic illness in CDS-I 




illness if it is between CDS-I and CDS-II and therefore I do not include them in the 
analysis for the years in between the first two CDSs. Similarly if the emergence of a 
chronic illness occurs between CDS-II and CDS-III then no information is available 
about timing of the child’s health condition. Therefore I do not include the information of 
these children’s’ mothers for the years in between CDS-II and CDS-III. However, if the 
children develop illness in CDS-II and their chronic illness condition persists in CDS-III 
then I carry forward the new information on these children from CDS-II to CDS-III. 
  I restrict my analysis to mothers of children between 0 to 18 years. I maintain this 
age restriction when I carry forward the information on chronic child illness from CDS-I 
to CDS-III. For example if a child is 9 years old in 1997 (CDS-I), then he or she will not 
be considered in 2007 (CDS-III). For some of the mothers the race variable was not 
consistent over the time period from 1997 to 2007 and therefore in order to maintain 
consistency I make the necessary correction for this variable. Similarly I make the 
necessary correction for education variable of a mother. The following table shows the 
number of married mothers for three CDS periods after the filtering of data.  
 Child Development Supplements (CDS) Data 
Mothers CDS-I(1997) CDS-II (2002-03) CDS-III(2007) 
All(14-64) 2256 1777 1145 
Married mothers after 
filtering (16-64) 
1260 1152 816 
Balanced panel after filtering data: number of married mothers (16-64): 787 
Number of married mothers exists in CDS-I but not interviewed in CDS-II: 254 




Using the assumption of chronic child illnesses, I have obtained information on 
married mothers from the in between CDS periods. The following table shows the 
number of married mothers from all the sample years available from the PSID and CDS 
dataset. 
Married mothers (with < 18 years children) from PSID and CDS: 
 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Married mothers 
after filtering 
1260 1176 1173 1152 980 816 
Balanced panel after filtering data: number of married mothers (16-64): 743 
List of 28 illnesses provided in Child Development Supplement dataset 
An epileptic fit or convulsion, Asthma, Diabetes, More than three ear infections in a year, 
speech impairment of delay, serious hearing difficulty or deafness, serious difficulty 
seeing or blindness, Mental retardation, A serious emotional disturbance, Anemia or an 
iron deficiency, Elevated levels of lead in the blood, Orthopedic impairment, 
Developmental delay, A learning disability, Autism, Hyperactivity (ADHD or ADD), 
Allergies, Breathing Disorders, Skin disease, Headaches, Birth defects, Tonsillitis, Heart 
problem, Sickle Cell Anemia, Bed wetting problems, Jaundice, Digestive problems, 
Hernia. 
---***--- 
